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5 
Problems and Conclusions 
The Third World, Global Islam and Pragmatism: 
The Making of Iranian Foreign Policy 
The Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the last nation 
states to deliberately position itself strategically 
and ideologically in opposition to the United States. 
The reasons for this lie in the history of Iran in the 
twentieth century and – in the view of the regime 
in Tehran – in the Islamic character and specifically 
Persian features of the country. More than thirty years 
after the Islamic revolution it is still unclear to many 
in the Western world what ideology Iran actually 
espouses and hence what are the principles and goals 
guiding Iranian foreign policy. Opinions on this sub-
ject are determined on the one hand by mistrust of an 
Islamic regime and fear of religious fundamentalism 
and on the other by surprise at the pragmatism of 
Iranian foreign policy. 
Depending on which of these perceptions is the 
dominant one, this leads to two opposing assessments 
of Iran: either that its policies are dominated by reli-
gious irrationalism, which, in combination with Iran’s 
nuclear programme, constitutes a global threat – 
adherents of this view believe the international com-
munity should rigorously oppose this programme; or 
the opposite view that ideology is only window dres-
sing for a nation state acting rationally in defence of 
its own interests. A closer look at the main priorities 
of Iranian foreign policy reveals that neither of these 
positions is tenable as such. 
Ideology and pragmatism in fact go hand in hand 
in Iranian foreign policy. The question of whether the 
Islamic Republic stands for an ideology that exploits 
the resources of the Iranian nation for its own ends, or 
whether the nation-state of Iran is using an ideological 
construct to boost its status in the international com-
munity must ultimately go unanswered, since even 
in Iran itself no consensus exists on this point. What 
observers do agree about is that anti-Americanism 
forms the basis for the ideology and hence for Iranian 
foreign policy. A shift in this stance would obviously 
have far-reaching consequences for Iran’s relations 
with the international community, and there have in 
fact been repeated instances of cooperation between 
the United States and Iran motivated by converging 
interests, albeit not sufficient to bring about a break-
through in relations. The reasons for the continuing 
distance between the two states are not only ideologi-
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6 
cal but often practical. The Americans, for instance, 
stumble over the question of who should make con-
tact with whom in Iran. 
Iran’s institutional framework and how Iranian 
foreign policy is formulated behind the scenes are the 
source of considerable uncertainty in the West. How 
much latitude Iranian decision-makers – whether the 
president, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolu-
tion or the general secretary of the Supreme National 
Security Council – have in foreign policy has been a 
matter of repeated speculation, although it is actually 
quite easy to trace the process by which a foreign 
policy consensus is arrived at. Of particular interest 
to Western observers are the latest developments on 
the Iranian think tank scene, which is becoming an 
increasingly important factor underpinning Iranian 
diplomacy. 
Most studies seeking to explain the true nature 
of Iran and how it functions stress the role of Islam, 
specifically the dominant Shiite confession (in its 
revolutionary form), or the distinctly Persian features 
of Iranian culture. What they often overlook, how-
ever, is a political discourse that is central for Ira-
nians, namely, the Third World rhetoric from which 
the Iranians derive their identity and their self-image 
as the spearhead of developing countries. Yet it is 
precisely this view of the world that constitutes the 
real ideological sticking point between the West and 
Iran, since it generally leads to diametrically opposed 
interpretations of world events. This applies not only 
to the classic case of different readings of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty but also to less complex issues, 
such as the question of whether Iran is actually 
isolated or not. It also explains why Iran assumes as 
a matter of course that its actions and behaviour 
will have the support of what it calls the “true inter-
national community” – represented by the Non-
Aligned Movement and Islamic countries – which 
in turn bolsters Iranian self-confidence. 
For the international community Iran’s geostrate-
gic importance means that alongside its nuclear 
programme the country’s regional policy is the most 
important element of Tehran’s foreign policy. Here 
two main focuses can be identified: on the one hand, 
Central Asia and the Caucasus and on the other, the 
Middle East, defined as the area stretching from the 
Persian Gulf to the Levant, including Egypt. Both of 
these regions are of equal importance for Iran, yet 
there are two reasons why its status and prestige are 
derived mainly from its activities in and vis-à-vis the 
Middle East: first, because in Western eyes Iran’s 
hostile attitude towards Israel and its rejection of 
American hegemony in the region constitute the 
greatest threat to regional security; and second, 
because for an important part of the Iranian elite the 
Middle East is of major significance for ideological 
and biographical reasons. Tehran’s relations with the 
former Soviet republics in Central Asia and the Cau-
casus have never carried comparable weight and have 
been considered secondary both by the West and 
by Iran – even though Iran’s security policy and eco-
nomic ambitions would suggest that the Central 
Asian-Caucasus region should take priority. 
The changes ushered in by the Arab Spring in the 
Middle East initially had no repercussions for Iran’s 
strategic position. Egypt’s return to its role as a mod-
erate Islamic power was greeted by Iran, in some cases 
even lauded. The real test for Iran is Syria. The popular 
rebellion against the Assad regime and the decision 
of the Palestinian Hamas to opt out of the so-called 
“axis of resistance” have dealt severe ideological blows 
to Tehran. The long and painful agony of the Assad 
regime has already produced a strategic stalemate 
between regional and global actors. In the long term 
this crisis has the potential to escalate into a regional 
or super-regional war waged on the basis of ethnicity 
and confession. This would be neither in the interests 
of the West nor of Iran. As in the case of Afghanistan it 
is likely to prove impossible to resolve the Syrian crisis 
without the involvement of Iran. In view of the new 
situation in the Middle East, therefore, a review of 
relations with Iran would seem advisable, making a 
resolution of the nuclear issue all the more urgent. 
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7 
Iranian Foreign Policy Actors and Institutions 
 
Western observers complain time and again about 
what they view as the complex and non-transparent 
Iranian foreign policy system, saying it is neither clear 
how responsibilites are allocated nor what influence 
the institutions in question have on this policy field. 
It would certainly be true to say that Tehran’s foreign 
policy is not only formulated and conducted by 
the Foreign Ministry. Other institutions, such as the 
National Security Council, the President’s Office, the 
Office of the Supreme Leader and the parliament also 
participate. What is more, via the parliament, the for-
eign policy decision-making process is also informed 
by the recommendations of state think tanks, declara-
tions and public statements of the Grand Ayatollahs, 
and public opinion as conveyed by the media. Extreme 
splinter groups also bring their influence to bear, 
although this seems to be waning. 
In practice the problem of unclear allocation of 
competencies between state and revolutionary insti-
tutions is regulated by a three-step convention.1
1. Foreign policy analysis and the real opinion-forming 
process take place within the formal institutions. 
 This 
is based on a mechanism of intensive preliminary con-
sultations in which the Supreme Leader is assigned a 
central role. 
2. The decision-making process takes place formally (insti-
tutions) and informally (political networks) within 
the political elites to which not only active but also 
former politicians belong, as do “non-political” 
clerics. 
3. The final decision is formulated by the Supreme 
Leader as a consensus reached by the political elite. 
 
1  Bernard Hourcade, Géopolitique de l’Iran (Paris, 2010), 158; 
Mehran Kamrava, “Iranian National-Security Debates: Faction-
alism and Lost Opportunities,” Middle East Policy, vol. 14, 
no. 2 (Summer 2007): 84–100; Walter Posch, E pluribus unum: 
Decision-makers and Decision-making in Iran, ISS Policy Brief 02 
(Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies [EUISS], 
August 2008). 
The Foreign Ministry and the 
President’s Office 
At the level of government it is the Foreign Ministry 
and the President’s Office which prepare foreign policy 
decisions. Their clearly regulated competences assign 
the president the stronger position, making it difficult 
for even proactive foreign ministers to put their own 
stamp on foreign policy. This is compounded by the 
fact that the foreign minister often belongs to a dif-
ferent political group to the president, a deliberate 
custom designed to allow other forces to have a hand 
in shaping foreign policy. Politically this construction 
is not always viable, as was clearly illustrated when 
Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki was removed 
from office at the end of 2010 by President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinezhad.2 In dismissing Mottaki, Ahmadinez-
had was following the international trend of the 
presidentialisation of foreign policy.3
Their appointment is, however, also the expression 
of an emerging new generation of foreign policy per-
sonnel. The professional diplomats who served the 
previous imperial regime or who belonged to the first 
generation of revolutionaries in the Foreign Ministry 
had graduated mainly from European or US universi-
ties. They are now retiring from active service and are 
 As president he 
appointed personal envoys for various regions of the 
world and spheres of international policy who then 
de facto governed the Foreign Ministry from the Presi-
dent’s Office. Nevertheless, even under Ahmadinezhad 
it was the Foreign Ministry that dominated the foreign 
policy opinion-forming process, its structural strength 
(esprit de corps, well-established procedures) proving 
superior to the president’s personal envoys. 
 
2  Walter Posch, Foreign Minister Mottaki Dismissed and Salehi 
Installed: New Trends in Iranian Diplomacy before Istanbul Nuclear 
Talks, SWP-Comments 2/2011 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, January 2011). 
3  Volker Perthes, “Der zweite Mann: Präsidialisierung der 
Außenpolitik,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 25, 2010; Seyyed 
Hamid Mottaghi, “The Adventure of the Commissioners Who 
Became Advisers. A Study of the Goals and Reasons for the 
Appointment of Special Envoys for Diplomacy,” Hamshahri 
Mah (October 2010): 64–66 (the Persian titles and quotes were 
translated by the author). 
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8 
being replaced by actors who experienced the Iran-
Iraq war (1980–1988) as soldiers and who were 
educated entirely in Iran. Future Iranian diplomats 
will no longer come equipped with the knowledge of 
Western culture that still characterised those of the 
revolutionary generation. The career of the current 
nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, who joined the Foreign 
Ministry after serving in the security apparatus, is 
a good example. How much the new generation of 
Iranian diplomats lacks a cultural and political under-
standing of the West is illustrated by their behaviour 
following the Western outcry prompted by the so-
called “Holocaust conference” in 2006. They were not 
only surprised to learn but also incapable of recognis-
ing that the West saw Ahmadinezhad’s inflammatory 
statements in the context of the hardening of the Ira-
nian position on the nuclear issue. Since then the hor-
ror vision of a “nuclear holocaust” initiated by Iran – 
i.e., the fear that Iran could wipe out the state of Israel 
with nuclear weapons – has dominated the image of 
Iran in the eyes of the Western public. 
The President, the Parliament and 
Splinter Groups 
The president plays a central role in the political 
decision-making process. On the basis of the consti-
tution and within the given ideological framework he 
is responsible for setting new foreign policy emphases 
and priorities. The only limitation is that he has to 
answer for them before parliament, the Supreme 
Leader and the Supreme National Security Council. 
This can lead to dramatically diverging interpretations 
of Iranian foreign policy, as the example of Israel 
shows: President Mohammad Khatami visited the syn-
agogue in Tehran,4 promoted his “Dialogue between 
Civilisations” and gave to understand that in the event 
of a resolution of the Middle East conflict Iran did not 
wish to be “more Palestinian than the Palestinians”. 
President Ahmadinezhad, by contrast, quoted an old 
statement of Khomeini’s about the need to eliminate 
Israel and in 2006 organised the above-mentioned 
“Holocaust conference”.5
 
4  Arash Abaie, “Report of Iranian President’s Visit from 
Yousef-Abad Synagogue,” http://www.iranjewish.com/ 
News_e/22-1.htm. 
 The differences in emphasis 
5  In 2012 Ahmadinezhad admitted to the US journalist 
Barbara Slavin that this had been a mistake. See “How Many 
Billions Will Ahmadinezhad’s Late Regrets Cost the Iranian 
People?” (Persian), Baztab, September 29, 2012. 
in a foreign policy that basically remained the same 
could not have been greater. 
The situation is different with the various interest 
groups and political groups, which exert influence 
both on public opinion and, via parliament, on 
the decisions taken by the president. Foreign policy 
debates in the Iranian parliament can be very fierce, 
particularly when supporters of the president are 
in the minority, as was the case in the final years of 
Khatami’s presidency. Yet even then, according to the 
constitution and convention, the president is still in 
a stronger position. An Iranian president is only con-
sidered to be a “lame duck” in foreign policy when the 
Supreme Leader publically withdraws his favour, as 
Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad experienced from spring 
2011 onwards if not indeed before. 
Despite visible efforts to base decision-making in 
foreign policy questions on a consensus, it happens 
time and again that individual groups feel overlooked 
and try to exert their influence through aggressive 
rhetoric or even violence. These are groups connected 
with the ideological volunteer militias (Basij and Hez-
bollah) whose mouthpiece is the daily Keyhan. Their 
activities are primarily directed towards domestic 
policy, but their wrath is kindled by controversial 
foreign policy issues such as Iran’s relationship with 
Israel and the United States. It was they who in the 
1980s obtained the pronouncement of the death sen-
tence against the Anglo-Indian writer Salman Rushdie 
at a time when the Rafsanjani government was seek-
ing a de-escalation of foreign policy and cautiously 
liberalising domestic policy. These forces also bore 
responsibility for the series of murders in the 1990s 
to which renowned intellectuals fell victim; these too 
were intended as punitive gestures against the presi-
dent – then Khatami – for his perceived liberalism. 
And President Ahmadinezhad, too, was forced in the 
summer of 2012 by these militias to publically declare 
his willingness to negotiate with the United States a 
mistake.6
 
6  “The President in a Three-hour Meeting with Student 
Activitists” (Persian), http://www.598.ir, August 3, 2012. 
The students were Basijis. 
 The storming of the British embassy by the 
Basij in 2011 belongs in the same category. This in-
cident led to mutual expulsions of embassy personnel 
and almost resulted in the breaking-off of British-
Iranian relations. Unlike the occupation of the US em-
bassy in 1979, this attempt via revolutionary actions 
and pressure from the street to influence the country’s 
foreign policy did not, however, meet with sympathy 
The Supreme National Security Council 
SWP Berlin 
The Making of Iranian Foreign Policy 
April 2013 
 
 
 
9 
among the public or the regime. Indeed, the Iranian 
Foreign Ministry condemned this breach of diplomatic 
conventions. 
The Supreme National Security Council 
The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran is chaired by the president 
and comprises the most important representatives of 
the military (the General Staff, the Islamic Revolution-
ary Guard Corps, IRGC) and the secret service, the for-
eign minister, representatives of the Supreme Leader, 
and other ministers as required. The significance of 
the SNSC lies in the fact that the president can declare 
any issue to be a matter of national security, thus 
sometimes turning the SNSC into a kind of ersatz gov-
ernment.7 Although the SNSC is primarily a technical 
administrative body, when it comes to delicate sub-
stantive issues it is assigned the function of a clearing 
house, which prepares the various opinions and stand-
points in the institution into a final draft resolution 
for the Supreme Leader. In most cases, however, its 
work comprises the routine handling of security 
policy issues, led by the general secretary in place of 
the president. Above and beyond this the SNSC is the 
most important forum for the IRGC to present their 
foreign policy ideas. The concept of “defence diplo-
macy”8 presented in 2012, which envisaged an up-
grading of the Ministry of Defence vis-à-vis the Foreign 
Ministry, failed to win approval. The SNSC also pub-
lishes strategic analyses for the future, which provide 
the basis for defence planning.9
The status of the SNSC was enhanced when General 
Secretary Dr. Hassan Rouhani was appointed Iranian 
chief negotiator in the nuclear dispute with the EU 
in 2003. The reason for this appointment was the col-
lapse of the consensus on how to proceed with regard 
to nuclear policy. Some political forces represented in 
the Security Council were obstructing the policy of 
then President Khatami for tactical reasons connected 
with domestic policy, and Rouhani was well con-
nected with both reformists and various conservative 
 
 
7  Mahmoud Asgari, “Iran’s Defense Diplomacy,” Discourse: 
An Iranian Quarterly, vol. 10, nos. 1–2 (Winter–Spring 2012): 
167–91, here 184–86. 
8  “Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi on Iran’s Defense Diplo-
macy” (Tehran: Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies, 
October 2012), http://en.merc.ir/default.aspx?tabid=98& 
ArticleId=312. 
9  Asgari, “Iran’s Defense Diplomacy” (see note 7), 178. 
groups and enjoyed the confidence of Khatami and 
the Supreme Leader and was hence a more suitable 
person to conduct negotiations with the EU and later 
with the E3+3 (Great Britain, France, Germany, USA, 
China and Russia). Since then these two posts have 
been linked. The weakening of President Ahmadinez-
had from 2011 onwards in turn was accompanied by a 
political strengthening of the new (since 2007) Chair-
man Saeed Jalili, thus further enhancing the function 
of the general secretary of the SNSC. 
The Clergy, the Guardian Council, the Expedi-
ency Council and the Assembly of Experts 
The High Clergy in Qom, the Guardian Council, the 
Expediency Council and the Assembly of Experts tend to 
be mainly consultative bodies. The High Clergy are 
generally informed of important political events, such 
as nuclear negotiations, but otherwise have a hands-
off attitude to foreign policy. Only under Ahmadinez-
had’s presidency were there such major tensions 
between the clergy and the government that the 
clergy used its influence to torpedo foreign policy.10
Even more than the High Clergy, the Guardian 
Council, the Assembly of Experts and the Expediency 
Council have a right to hearings with the Supreme 
Leader.
 
11
Think-Tanks and Foreign Policy and 
Security Journals 
 They not only advise him but also coordinate 
the work of the various institutions such as parlia-
ment, the Foreign Ministry and the SNSC. They also 
strive to maintain a balance between different politi-
cal tendencies with the aim of ensuring that foreign 
policy is supported by all political forces. 
Like other countries Iran has research institutes for 
foreign and security policy whose expertise the For-
eign Ministry draws on. The researchers at these 
 
10  “Clear Words from Hojatoleslam Rahbar: the Grand 
Ayatollahs Have Closed the Doors of Their Offices to the 
Government!” (Persian), Shaffaf, May 19, 2012. 
11  The Assembly of Experts (“Assembly of Experts of the Lead-
ership,” http://www.khobregan.ir) monitors the execution of 
office of the Supreme Leader, and the “Council of Guardians 
of the Islamic Constitution,” http://www-shoura-gc.ir, moni-
tors the parliament. In the event of conflicts with the parlia-
ment the “Consultative Council for Establishing the Interests 
of the System” (http://www.maslehat.ir) is called in. 
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10 
institutes enjoy relative freedom in articulating their 
views. In this context Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah 
Ali Khamenei supports the free exchange of views and 
emphasises that differences of opinion between him-
self and the experts at these institutes should not be 
interpreted as opposition to the system of the “guard-
ianship of the Islamic jurist (velayat-e faqih)” of Iran.12
The majority of the think tanks were founded only 
in the early 1990s under the Rafsanjani presidency. 
This applies, for example, to the Diplomatic School, 
which is primarily a training institute but also en-
gages in research. The main centre for research into 
foreign and security policy is the Center for Inter-
national Research and Education (CIRE)
 
13 located in 
the Foreign Ministry itself. The CIRE includes the 
internationally known Institute for Political and Inter-
national Studies (IPIS),14
Like the Foreign Ministry the Expediency Council 
also has its own think tank, the Center for Strategic 
Research (CSR),
 which is both a research 
centre and a political advisory body. The IPIS also orga-
nises international conferences and was one of the 
most interesting political think tanks in the Middle 
East until the “Holocaust conference” in 2006. (There-
after the IPIS was boycotted and only in 2009, follow-
ing a change of personnel, did the international 
research community begin consulting it again.) The 
IPIS publishes nine foreign policy journals in several 
languages and is indirectly represented abroad by the 
research attachés at the embassies. In October 2012 
the head of the IPIS was charged with coordinating 
Iranian track two diplomacy. 
15
The third think tank with direct political relevance 
is the research unit of the Iranian parliament, the 
Majlis Research Center (MRC), which was restructured 
in 2012. The chairman of the parliamentary foreign 
affairs committee, Kazem Jalali, and the parliamen-
 which likewise conducts foreign and 
security policy research and participates in Iranian 
track two diplomacy. Both institutes are well con-
nected with the relevant academic institutions and 
with the active diplomatic service. It is not uncommon 
for Iranian diplomats to spend several years doing 
research at one of these two institutions. 
 
12  “The views of experts that do not concur with those of 
the Supreme Leader are not regarded as opposition to the 
rule of the Islamic jurist” (Persian), Tabnak, August 6, 2012. 
13  Center for International Research and Education of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.dermfa.ir. 
14  Institute for Political and International Studies, 
http://www.ipis.ir. 
15  Center for Strategic Research, http://www.csr.ir. 
tary speaker, Ali Larijani, are trying to give the MRC a 
more prominent role.16
The President’s Office and military establishments (the 
army and the IRGC, the joint general staff, military 
schools or academies) also have their own foreign 
and security policy research units whose research 
findings are published in renowned Iranian security 
journals ( Journal for National Security, Journal for National 
Defence, Name-ye Defa, Journal for Strategic Information, all 
in Persian). It is almost impossible to gain access to 
these journals abroad, since even specialist libraries 
in Europe or the United States rarely carry journals 
in Persian. Of central importance for the opinion-
forming process in security policy is the Supreme 
National Defence University (SNDU), which is also 
where cadres destined for the Iranian security elite 
are educated.
 However, the centre has yet 
to establish itself as a port of call for foreign contacts. 
17 A Committee for Defence Diplomacy 
under Defence Minister General Vahidi was also 
founded in the Defence Ministry, which operates like 
a think tank but has yet to make an appearance on 
the international stage.18
Finally, mention should be made of the Institute for 
Middle East Strategic Studies (IMESS)
 
19 and the Tehran 
International Studies and Research Institute (TISRI).20 
Both are independent institutes, publish several jour-
nals (e.g. Discourse, published by the IMESS) and act has 
political advisory bodies. Their work is complemented 
by specialised university institutes such as the Africa 
Research Center and the Tarbiat-Modares-University21 
and privately initiated research institutions. The influence 
of the latter depends very much on what access their 
founders have to political decision-makers. The most 
important are the International Institute for Caspian 
Studies of former Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas 
Maleki;22
 
16  Majlis Research Center, http://rc.majlis.ir/en/news/show/ 
816611. 
 the Association Iranienne des Études Inter-
nationales, chaired by human rights expert Mehdi 
17  Supreme National Defence University, http://www.sndu. 
ac.ir. 
18  Asgari, “Iran’s Defense Diplomacy” (see note 7), p. 180. 
19  Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies, http://en. 
merc.ir/Default.aspx?tabid=180. 
20  Abrar Moaser Tehran International Studies and Research 
Institute, http://www.tisri.org. 
21  Tarbiat Modares University, African Studies Center, 
http://www.modares.ac.ir/en/reu/ctr/ASC/res/pub/fas. 
22  International Institute for Caspian Studies, http://www. 
caspianstudies.com. 
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Zakerian,23 which publishes the renowned International 
Studies Journal (ISJ); and the Ravand Institute for Eco-
nomic and International Studies led by its founder 
and CEO Hossein Adeli, former governor of the Cen-
tral Bank of Iran and former ambassador to Great 
Britain.24
Whereas the publications of the above-mentioned 
institutes and associations are targeted mainly at an 
academic readership, the dailies Ettelaat and Hamshahri 
publish weekly or monthly magazines (respectively, 
Ettelaat-e Siyasi va Eqtesadi and Hamshahri-ye Diplomatik) 
focusing on international relations and strategic 
issues. The political magazines of various organisa-
tions, such as the Islamic volunteers organisation 
Basij-e Mostaza’fin (Okhovvat, Hedayat, Misaq-e Basiji, 
Faslname-ye Motaleat-e Basij),
 Ravand has, however, severely curtailed its 
international activities in recent years. 
25
Finally mention should be made of the Internet, 
particularly the blogospheres and websites where 
members of the military and politicians comment 
on foreign policy. Altogether these Internet plat-
forms and the above-mentioned journals make up the 
forums in which academics and the general public 
can express their opinions on Iranian foreign policy. 
In recent years, moreover, Iranian public diplomacy 
has become increasingly important. The founding of 
PressTV, for example, represented an attempt by the 
Iranians to counteract the impact of Western public 
diplomacy (US State Department, NATO) in the region 
and in Iran.
 also carry commentaries 
on foreign policy positions. The quality of these 
publications is rather modest, but they do provide 
a good insight into the political discourse of an 
important minority of radical Islamists from whose 
ranks the regime recruits some of its personnel. 
26
 
23  International Studies Journal, http://isj.ir/english/ 
aboutus.htm. 
 
24  Ravand Institute for Economic and International Studies, 
http://www.ravandinstitute.com. 
25  Links to some of these magazines can be found under 
http://www.hadi.basirat.ir; on the Basijis see http://www. 
basij.ir and http://www.bro.ir. 
26  Mehrdad Kiaei, “The OIC and Public Diplomacy: Limits 
and Opportunities,” Discourse. An Iranian Quarterly, vol. 10, 
no. 1–2 (Winter–Spring 2012): 145–65. 
The Role of the Supreme Leader in 
Iranian Foreign Policy 
According to the Iranian Constitution, Grand Aya-
tollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the “guardian jurist” 
(vali-feqh) and “leader of the Islamic revolution” (rahbar-
e enghelab-e eslami), is ranked above the state president 
but does not himself strictly speaking belong to the 
government apparatus. Nevertheless, political power 
is concentrated in his hands and his competencies are 
both administrative-bureaucratic and clerical and 
ideological. 
The Organisation of the beyt-e rahbari and the 
Interpretation of Ideology 
The Bureau of the Supreme Leader (beyt-e rahbari)27
Of special importance for foreign policy are the 
public speeches of the Supreme Leader, in which he 
expounds the Iranian line to the Iranian and foreign 
public before an audience consisting of regime sup-
porters, civil servants and political commentators. 
These speeches define the government’s ideological 
latitude. In certain cases the Supreme Leader pursues 
a parallel foreign policy via the cultural institutes and 
the defence attachés at the embassies. This was often 
what happened under the Khatami presidency, whose 
detente with the West led some actors in Iran to fear 
that the Islamic Republic would lose its standing 
among radical Islamic forces. 
 is 
regarded as the country’s real power centre. The staff 
of the beyt are involved in all levels of the institutional 
opinion-forming process and thus informed about 
planned foreign policy in advance. As a rule the Su-
preme Leader supports the political stance of the pres-
ident, and when differences of opinion arise he is able, 
discreetly but efficiently, to bring pressure to bear. 
Fundamental foreign policy decisions, such as the 
decision to continue the E3+3 negotiations or Iran’s 
insistence on its right to uranium enrichment, are 
formulated as consensus decisions by the Supreme 
Leader following intensive consultation in which the 
bureau (beyt) and the SNSC have important roles to 
play. 
 
27  Nothing is known about the structure of the beyt nor pre-
cisely what its functions are. What is known for certain is 
that it employs 5,000 people. 
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Khamenei’s Revolutionary and Clerical 
Functions Abroad 
The theological-clerical function (marja‘-e taqlid and vali-
feqh) of the Supreme Leader is emphasised vis-à-vis 
countries with Shiite populations or strong Shiite 
minorities, such as Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan, 
and the parallel foreign policy hence becomes more 
important. The relationship with Lebanon is a special 
case where relations between Iran and Hezbollah and 
the Shiites take precedence over normal bilateral rela-
tions with Beirut.28 Khamenei justifies the preferential 
treatment given to Hezbollah by citing his function 
as ruling guardian jurist and as a religious “model 
for emulation”. Hezbollah is thus part of the Iranian 
regime (though not of the Iranian state).29
The personal connections behind this close relation-
ship are also interesting. Hezbollah General Secretary 
Seyyed Hasan Nasrallah is regarded as a confidant of 
Khamenei, and he and Muhammad Yazbek are Kha-
menei’s Lebanese representatives (vakil) in his function 
as a Shiite cleric.
 
30 There is a special relationship of 
trust between the Supreme Leader and the master-
mind behind Hezbollah’s military apparatus, Imad 
Mughniya, assassinated in 2008, who also worked 
closely with the IRGC.31
 
28  Houchang Esfandiar Chehabi, “Iran and Lebanon in the 
Revolutionary Decade,” in ibidem, Distant Relations. Iran and 
Lebanon in the Last 500 Years (London and New York, 2006),  
201–30. 
 Hezbollah and the IRGC are 
also known to cooperate closely in the field of secu-
rity (carrying out joint attacks in Western countries, 
training pro-Iranian groups in the region), so we can 
assume that the Supreme Leader and his staff are 
well informed about the activities of the Lebanese 
organisation. As a rule Hezbollah acts largely in-
dependently, albeit in consultation and in some cases 
in cooperation with Iran. This autonomy has appar-
ently increased since the 33-day war against Israel 
in 2006. But since the murder of Imad Mughniyah in 
2008 representatives of the IRGC have once again 
begun to wield more influence. 
29  Olfa Lamloum, “La Syrie et le Hezbollah: Partenaires 
sous contrainte?” Le Hezbollah, état des lieux, ed. Sabrina Mervin 
(Paris, 2008), 93–108. 
30  Sabrina Mervin, “La guidance du théologien-juriste: de la 
théorie à la pratique,” in ibid. (ed.), Le Hezbollah (see note 29), 
207–212 (211). 
31  Elie Chalhoub, “Imad Mughniyah in Iran: The Stuff of 
Legends,” al akhbar (online), February 12, 2012; “Imad Mugh-
niyah Was Murdered in Damascus” (Persian), Entekhab, Feb-
ruary 15, 2008. 
Plans for Iraq ran along similar lines. Renowned 
Iraqi clerics, many from mixed Iranian-Iraqi families, 
worked in high-up positions in the Bureau of the Su-
preme Leader or else held Iranian government offices. 
Yet the political platforms of the Iraqi Shiites initiated 
by the Iranians (Supreme Council for the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq [SCIRI], the Badr Brigade and later 
Muqtada al Sadr’s organisation) never achieved the 
level of efficiency and significance of the Lebanese 
Hezbollah. And the present head of the Iraqi govern-
ment, Nuri al Maleki, is a politician whose roots are in 
the Iraqi Dawa movement, which has always refused 
to be patronised by Iran. In bilateral relations with 
Iraq the Bureau of the Supreme Leader thus has a 
more minor role to play. 
By the same token, Khamenei has had little success 
in bringing the networks and theological centres of 
the high Shiite clergy in Iraq into line (Najaf and Ker-
bela), even if they are more dependent on Tehran 
today than they were a generation ago.32 Most Iraqi 
grand ayatollahs still act autonomously and maintain 
a critical distance to the policies of their neighbour.33 
While Iran must heed the sensitivities of the high 
Shiite clergy in its foreign policy, it cannot automati-
cally count on its support.34
Leader of the Islamic World? 
 
Iran’s claim to be the leading Islamic power – aptly 
expressed in the title “Commander of the Faithful” 
(amiro l-momenin or vali-amr-e moslemin-e jehan) assumed 
by the Supreme Leader – has led to major problems 
with the Sunni countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, 
but also Egypt and Turkey. A commonly held view 
among Islamic circles in Tehran is that Khamenei’s 
function as the theological and political “rule of the 
Islamic jurist” (velayat-e faqih) only needs to be properly 
explained35
 
32  Mehdi Khalaji, The Last Marja. Sistani and the End of Tra-
ditional Religious Authority in Shiism, Washington, D.C.: The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2006 
(Policy Focus, No. 59), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ 
uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus59final.pdf. 
 for sufficient numbers of Sunnis to submit 
33  Laurence Louer, Chiisme et politique au Moyen-Orient, Iran, 
Irak, Liban, monarchies du Golfe (Paris, 2008), 43–48 and 71, 72. 
34  “A Special Message from the Supreme Leader to Ayatollah 
Sistani” (Persian), Fararu, January 6, 2008. 
35  “The fatwa that overcame the misfortune of the divisions 
among Muslims” (Persian), Okhovvat, 11 (Autumn 2010): 54–63. 
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to it. Outside Iran, of course, this leadership claim is 
scarcely recognised.36
The office of Supreme Leader and the attendant 
organisation is the only really ideological compo-
nent in the formation of Iranian foreign policy. This 
office does not operate in a political and institutional 
vacuum, however, but is networked with a well-struc-
tured foreign policy apparatus supported by modern 
research institutions. This apparatus is set up to 
promote a broad spectrum of opinions, thus almost 
always allowing Iranian decision-makers to choose 
between ideological and pragmatic concepts in for-
eign policy. 
 
 
 
 
36  On this see Wilfried Buchta, “The Failed Pan-Islamic Pro-
gram of the Islamic Republic: Views of the Liberal Reformers 
of the Religious ‘Semi-Opposition’,” Iran and the Surrounding 
World: Interactions in Culture and Cultural Politics, ed. Nikki R. 
Keddie and Rudolph P. Matthee (Washington, D.C. 2002),  
281–304. 
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Ideology and Pragmatism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
Iran’s “Islamic ideology” is not so much a stringently 
formulated ideology in the true sense of the word 
as a mixture of different political takes on the world 
embracing nationalism, anti-colonialism and anti-
imperialism, ideas adapted from Marxism, political 
Islam and traditional Shiite political thinking. The 
inherent contradictions between these components 
make it almost impossible to shape any kind of co-
hesive realpolitik out of them: political Islam of the 
Khomeini ilk and Third World thinking are both 
revolutionary doctrines that claim to be universally 
valid; nationalism and Shia on the other hand are, 
respectively, Iran or Shia-centred and are traditional 
and conservative. 
Overview 
Ideological and Theological Influences on the 
Foreign Policy of Iran 
 Islamic Secular 
Revolutionary Political Islam 
Khomeinism 
Third World 
ideology 
Conservative Traditional Shia Nationalism 
 
Iranian diplomacy has exploited these contradic-
tions in order to bring more pragmatism – and hence 
more latitude for itself – into foreign policy, and it 
emphasises certain ideological elements to suit its 
requirements:37
 With respect to its immediate neighbours Iranian 
foreign policy is guided by national interests and 
hence pragmatic. Strategic policy is concerned 
mainly with territorial integrity, national sover-
eignty and the economic development of Iran. 
 
 Vis-à-vis the Islamic states in the region Iran under-
lines its Islamic revolutionary identity. In some 
cases, however, it must assume the role of a protec-
tive power for the Shiites in the region. A central 
policy focus in this sphere is defending Muslims, 
above all the Palestinians. 
 
37  See, for example, Mahmood Sariolghalam, The Foreign 
Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Persian) (Tehran, 2010), 69. 
 With respect to the rest of the world Iran highlights 
its identity as a Third World state and promotes 
anti-imperialism. 
Revolutionary Foreign Policy in the Iranian 
Constitution and Its Consequences 
Wherever the Iranian Constitution refers to foreign 
policy, the emphasis is always on the revolutionary 
aspects of the state ideology.38 Otherwise the principle 
of political independence runs through the whole text 
of the Iranian constitution like a leitmotif.39
Thus Article 3, paragraph 16, calls for Iran to be 
guided in its foreign policy by “Islamic standards” and 
by the principles of its “fraternal obligation towards 
all Muslims and the unconditional protection of the 
world’s oppressed”. Article 11 invokes the unity of the 
Islamic religious community and commits the govern-
ment to “conducting its entire policy on the basis of 
the friendship and concord of the Islamic nations and 
to continually striving to ... bring about the unity of 
the Islamic world”. These calls are repeated in more 
explicit form in Section Ten, Foreign Policy (Articles 
152–154) of the Constitution. Thus Article 153 con-
firms the ban on entering into agreements “that could 
give occasion for the establishment of foreign power 
positions in the areas of natural and economic re-
sources, culture, the army and other affairs of the 
country”. Alliances with “imperialist powers” are 
hence explicitly prohibited by Article 152. The same 
article stipulates that the constitution is valid beyond 
the state borders of Iran and asserts that the state of 
Iran must defend the rights of all Muslims. This obli-
gation is reiterated in similar words in Article 154, 
 
 
38  Silvia Tellenbach, Untersuchungen zur Verfassung der Islami-
schen Republik Iran vom 15. November 1979 (Berlin, 1985), 61–64; 
Asghar Schirazi; The Constitution of Iran. Politics and the State 
in Iran (London and New York, 1997); Yavuz Özoguz (ed.), Ver-
fassung der Islamischen Republik Iran (Bremen, 2007), 21–24. 
39  Tellenbach, Untersuchungen zur Verfassung (see note 38), 
231–35, and R. K. Ramazani, “Iran’s Foreign Policy: Indepen-
dence, Freedom and the Islamic Republic,” Iran’s Foreign Policy. 
From Khatami to Ahmadinejad, ed. Anoushiravan Ehteshami 
and Mahjoob Zweiri (Reading, 2008), 1–15. 
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which states that although the Islamic Republic will 
refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of 
other states, it nevertheless supports “the struggle of 
the oppressed (mostazafan, mazlum) to assert their rights 
vis-à-vis their oppressors (mostakberin, zalem) at any 
place in the world”. Here Iran articulates its claim that 
its own ideology is universally valid, and justifies this 
rather bold assertion by the fact that the Islamic 
Republic of Iran considers its goal to be “the happiness 
of people in all of human society”.40
The anti-imperialist orientation of the constitution 
and the revolutionary tradition form the basis for 
Iran’s anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism as important 
pillars of Iranian state ideology. Following the victo-
rious revolution Tehran revised its de facto recognition 
of Israel and either froze or broke off relations with 
Islamic states that maintained normal relations with 
Israel (Morocco, Egypt, Jordan). These steps and Iran’s 
hostility to Israel were justified on the grounds of the 
obligation ensuing from the constitution to support 
the oppressed Palestinians. At the same time the Ira-
nians maintain that their irreconcilable attitude to 
the Jewish state is not motivated by anti-Semitism and 
that hatred of the Jews is alien to them.
 
41
Were Iran to take literally the idealistic promises 
in its constitution, including the assertion of the uni-
versal validity of its own ideology, then Tehran would 
be obliged to engage in a foreign policy of permanent 
revolution. In reality, however, Iran was able to realise 
these utopian demands only in the first phase after 
1979, when the export of revolution and the dissemi-
nation of political Islam of the Khomeini stamp were 
indeed the central goals of its foreign policy. At the 
time, the long war against Iraq (1980–1988) was seen 
as part of a forthcoming great Islamic world revolu-
tion that would elevate the forces of political Islam 
to a real alternative to the opposing power blocs of 
the Cold War. These goals led Iran to adopt a strictly 
neutral position in the East-West conflict expressed in 
the slogan, “Neither East nor West – Islamic Republic”. 
Against this background it was only logical that Teh-
ran diplomacy should attach much weight to Iran’s 
membership in the Non-Aligned Movement. 
 
 
40  Tellenbach, Untersuchungen zur Verfassung (see note 38), 101; 
Özoguz, Verfassung (see note 38), 65. 
41  Homeyra Moshirizadeh and Ehsan Mesbah, “The Case 
of Israel in the Political Discourse of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran” (Persian), Ravabet-e Khareji, vol. 3, no. 1 (Spring 2011), 
245–70. 
Significance of the Non-aligned Movement 
After the end of the Cold War, the Non-Aligned Move-
ment (NAM), founded in 196142
Some groups in Tehran emphasise the ideological 
significance of the movement.
 by important states 
like India, Egypt, Brazil and Argentina, was largely 
forgotten in the West. For Iran, however, it remained 
important for two reasons: first, because Iran is insuf-
ficiently integrated in the institutional structures of 
international relations; and second, because the elites 
in Tehran believed that in the NAM they would receive 
the recognition denied them by part of the inter-
national community 
43 According to them 
the non-aligned states and developing countries are 
no longer threatened by imperialism in the classical 
sense but instead by “neo-imperialism,” by which they 
mean cultural and economic dependence on the West. 
They maintain that NAM countries have an obligation 
to change power relations all over the world, for 
example in the UN, to their advantage. Vice-president 
Mohammad Reza Rahimi sees the NAM of the future 
as a political bloc in its own right in a multipolar 
world that will join ranks to put up a united front to 
defy the West. Currently, he asserts, the movement is 
looking for a “standard bearer” – a role for which be 
believes Iran would be suitable.44
Nevertheless, the significance of the NAM is actu-
ally a subject of some controversy in Iran. Sceptics 
criticise the low degree of institutionalisation and the 
lack of cooperation within the organisation, and Iran 
was particularly offended by the lack of support for 
Tehran’s candidacy as a non-permanent member of 
the UN Security Council in 2008. 
 Hence Tehran sees 
itself as the leader of a “Third World bloc”. 
The conference of the NAM in Tehran in August 
2012, at which Iran took over the chair from Egypt, for 
the first time in decades received prominent coverage 
in the international media, thus giving Iran a rare op-
portunity to present itself as part of the international 
public sphere. The reason for the unusual amount of 
attention was major pressure on the part of Israel and 
the United States to boycott the conference, and which 
 
42  See http://www.csstc.org. 
43  Hamid-Reza Mahdavi, “The Non-aligned Movement and 
the Need to Change Its Foundations” (Persian), Seraj-e Basiji 
76 (December 2009/January 2010): 55–64. 
44  Mohammad Bagher Khorramshad, “What Role Do the 
Non-aligned Play in the Emerging New World Order?” (Per-
sian), Borhan, August 30, 2012; “NAM-members Seek Flag 
Bearer for US Hegemony,” Khabar Online, September 3, 2012. 
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culminated in a polemic against the traditional par-
ticipation of the UN secretary general in the meeting 
as well as that of other heads of state and government, 
specifically Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
and Egyptian Prime Minister Mohammad Morsi.45
Despite the summit going ahead as planned, it was 
also the scene of some discord. UN Secretary General 
Ban Ki-moon once again raised the subject of the Holo-
caust conference, while Mohammad Morsi opened his 
speech by praising the four Sunni Califs, which con-
stituted an affront to radical Shiites. His subsequent 
harsh criticism of the Syrian government was delib-
erately wrongly translated. The Western media gave 
prominent coverage to these frictions, yet the im-
pression they created did not tally with the one the 
participants had, for the Egyptians confined them-
selves to lodging energetic protests. Thus in Tehran 
the NAM conference was chalked up as a major suc-
cess for Iran,
 Ira-
nian politicians were not alone in interpreting the 
failure of this boycott campaign as proof of the United 
States’ inability to isolate Iran. 
46 even if the members of the NAM did 
not profess any support for the Syrian regime, as the 
Iranian government had perhaps hoped it would.47
The Iranian elites conclude from Iran’s membership 
in the NAM that Iran is integrated in and respected by 
the “real” world community.
 
48
 
45  Rick Gladstone, “U.N. Visit Will Set Back a Push to Isolate 
Iran,” The New York Times, August 23, 2012; Gabe Fischer, “Jeru-
salem Lobbying Countries to Boycott Non-Aligned Conference 
in Tehran,” The Times of Israel, August 2, 2012. 
 The conferences of the 
NAM hence serve the Islamic Republic as an “ersatz 
global public sphere.” Above and beyond this Tehran 
tacitly assumes that all member states of the NAM 
share Iran’s anti-imperialist stance. The meetings of 
the NAM are documented in detail in the Iranian 
media and serve to consolidate the anti-imperialist 
and anti-American position of the regime, making it 
more difficult to reach any understanding with the 
West. Nevertheless, the decision-makers in Tehran 
46  Gudrun Harrer, “Blockfreie in Tehran: die Rechnung ohne 
den Gast,” Der Standard, August 30, 2012; Dilip Hiro, “Non-
Aligned Summit Belies Isolation of Iran,” Yale Global Online, 
September 4, 2012. 
47  Final Document [of the] 16th Summit of Heads of State and Gov-
ernment of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM 2012/Doc.1/Rev2) 
(Tehran, August 31, 2012), http://nam.gov.ir/Portal/File/ 
ShowFile.aspx?ID=212cfdbf-6dbc-4185-a4f5-01fe30a0c772. 
48  Thomas Erdbrink, “Iran Preparing to Lead Global Non-
aligned Group,” The New York Times, August 14, 2012; Rudolph 
Chimelli, “Gleichgesinnte willkommen,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
August 20, 2012. 
have made repeated attempts to change Iran’s rela-
tionship with the United States. 
Anti-Americanism 
After radical Islamists stormed the US embassy in 
Tehran (1979) and took diplomatic personnel hostage 
(1979–1980) the United States broke off relations with 
revolutionary Iran. The opposition between the United 
States and Iran has since then been a strategic con-
stant in the region and anti-Americanism has become 
a defining paradigm of Iranian foreign policy.49
Economic Contacts and the “Grand Bargain” 
 
Despite breaking off diplomatic relations, Iran and 
the United States maintained economic contacts for 
many years after that. In the early 1980s, in the criti-
cal phase of the revolution in other words, the United 
States was still the largest purchaser of Iranian oil. It 
was not until the “Iran Libya Sanctions Act” of 1996 
that Washington curtailed its trading relations with 
Tehran, and even then food and medicines remained 
exempt from the sanctions until the middle of 2012. 
The United States was thus for a long time Iran’s most 
important supplier of wheat.50
Advocates of US-Iranian rapprochement in both 
countries were able repeatedly to voice their views. It 
is probably thanks to these people that the two sides 
were able to keep open low-profile channels of com-
munication known as track two diplomacy. In May 
2003 an Iranian memorandum was made public 
which formulated the chief points of possible cooper-
ation between the United States and Iran. The authors 
of this paper outlined possible arrangements for co-
operation in the field of terrorism, an agreement on 
the transparency of Iran’s nuclear program and recog-
nition of the two-state solution for Israel and Pales-
tine. But the main import of this document was its 
detailed timetable for confidence-building measures 
whereby the Iranians were prepared to make conces-
sions in return for the lifting of US sanctions. The 
initiative for this so-called “grand bargain” apparently 
 
 
49  Wilfried Buchta, “Iran,” Anti-Americanism in the Islamic 
World, ed. Sigrid Faath (Hamburg, 2006): 165–82. 
50  The last sale of US wheat to Iran, to the tune of at least 46 
million dollars, took place at the beginning of 2012. On this 
see Emily Stephenson, “Iran Buys US Wheat despite Nuclear 
Tensions,” Reuters, March 1, 2012. 
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came from the Iranian government, the memoran-
dum probably having been prepared in consultation 
with the Supreme Leader. The Swiss ambassador com-
municated it to the Americans, but the Bush adminis-
tration rejected the Iranian overtures, probably read-
ing them as a sign of weakness.51
Lifting the Taboo on Relations with the 
United States 
 
Nevertheless, in mid-2008 the United States modified 
its previously harsh attitude, offering in the context 
of the E3+3 format an extensive cooperation package 
to Iran. What is more, US Secretary of State at the time 
Condoleezza Rice together with the foreign ministers 
of the other five states involved in the dialogue signed 
a letter presented personally by Javier Solana to Ira-
nian Foreign Minister Mottaki inviting Iran to cooper-
ate with the international community.52 The reactions 
of the Iranian leadership were restrained and ulti-
mately negative. Evidently Tehran for its part now 
interpreted this letter as an admission of American 
weakness and thus allowed another chance to pass by. 
The Iranians then waited for the election of the new 
US president at the end of 2008, but without having 
any plan for the event that the successor to George W. 
Bush would adopt a more conciliatory policy towards 
Iran. All the greater the surprise in Tehran, then, 
at the message that the new US president, Barack H. 
Obama, addressed directly to the Iranian people to 
mark the occasion of the Persian New Year.53 On 25 
March 2009 Supreme Leader Khamenei responded 
in Mashhad.54
 
51  Nicholas D. Kristof, “Diplomacy at Its Worst,” The New York 
Times, April 29, 2007; the text of the “Guldimann Memoran-
dum,” named after the Swiss ambassador Tehran, who deliv-
ered the memorandum to the Americans, and his accompa-
nying letter can be found in Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance. 
The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the US (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2007), 341–46; François Heisbourg, Iran, 
le choix des armes? (Paris, 2007), 93–96. 
 While not refraining from provocative 
Islamic rhetoric, he for the first time portrayed rela-
52  On the significance of this offer in the context of Euro-
pean relations with Iran see Walter Posch, “The EU and Iran,” 
in The Routledge Handbook of European Security, ed. Sven Biscop 
and Richard Whitman (London, 2013): 179–88. 
53  Ian Black, “Barack Obama Offers Iran New Beginning with 
Video Message,” The Guardian, March 20, 2009, see also http:// 
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/20/barack-obama-video-
iran. 
54  See the video recording of his speech with English sub-
titles under: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t_oAHcsYqIs. 
tions with the United States in terms of opposing 
political interests rather than as a clash of ideologies. 
Khamenei thus cautiously lifted the taboo on the issue 
of normalising relations with the United States. Only then 
was Ahmadinezhad able to undertake an – ultimately 
unsuccessful – attempt to improve the relationship 
with the United States. There were two main reasons 
why he failed: pressure from radical splinter groups 
and the fact that Iran had yet to officially renounce its 
anti-Americanism. 
This change of paradigm in foreign policy away 
from anti-Americanism can only be accomplished by 
Khamenei. The logic of statesmanship would suggest 
this as an obvious step, as occasional instances of US-
Iranian cooperation show, testifying to a pragmatic 
approach on the Iranian side. 
Pragmatism (maslahat) as a 
Main Operational Principle 
Even while the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988) was still 
raging the Iranian elites were forced to recognise 
that a foreign policy based on ideology alone was not 
tenable and would do the country more harm than 
good. Internally it was difficult to win acceptance for 
the transition to more realism; first the influence of 
extremist elements – which had been going it alone in 
the export of revolution – had to be eliminated. After 
Khomeini accepted the UN Security Council’s ceasefire 
resolution 598 in 1988 and Rafsanjani and Khamenei 
assumed office, respectively, as president and Su-
preme Leader in 1990, the phase of aggressively ideo-
logical or utopian foreign policy came to an end. Since 
then pragmatism, professionalism and national inter-
ests have come to the fore, but of course without ide-
ology being abandoned as a frame of reference.55
 
55  Gary Sick, “A Revolution in Transition,” in Keddie and 
Matthee (eds.), Iran and the Surrounding World (see note 
 
The foreign policy maxim now became expediency 
(maslahat), whereby the regime put the benefits for 
the nation (and itself) ahead of ideological orthodoxy. 
Since Khomeini’s death (1989) the Iranian leadership 
has only once, in 1998, in connection with the can-
cellation of a planned military intervention in Afghan-
istan, referred explicitly to the maslahat principle. In a 
sober cost-benefit calculation it decided against the 
plans of the military whose exit strategy the govern-
ment did not find convincing. 
36): 
355–74. 
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Tehran has gone surprisingly far in pursuing this 
maslahat principle, even to the extent of cooperating 
with Israel. During the Iran-Iraq war what was known 
disparagingly in the official language as the “Zionist 
construct” became one of the most important sup-
pliers of arms and medicine and also bought Iranian 
oil – with the knowledge of Revolutionary Leader 
Khomeini. This cooperation continued under Rafsan-
jani and similar, mostly secret deals have been con-
cluded with influential Israeli business people until 
very recently.56
There is no doubt that the expediency principle 
has done much to bring about a de-escalation of Ira-
nian foreign policy. Yet for all its political pragma-
tism, maslahat does not mean the overcoming of ide-
ology but at most its containment. In many cases 
Tehran justifies or inflates changes in policy direction 
in ideological terms, sometimes even underpinning 
them with a decree from the Supreme Leader (hokm-e 
hokumati). Thus there is some evidence that although 
maslahat may be being used to overcome ideological 
orthodoxy in foreign policy, this moderation in the 
foreign policy sphere is balanced with a hardening 
of dogmatic positions in other areas, for instance in 
domestic policy. Moreover, even in foreign policy the 
maslahat principle is not associated with a de-ideologi-
sation in the true sense of the word. Some authors 
therefore take the view that ultimately there is noth-
ing to suggest that Iran is giving economic develop-
ment and the integration of the country in the global 
economy priority over the state ideology and that 
the doctrinaire approach is unlikely to be overcome 
because the elites obviously have no interest in this.
 
57
 
56  Daniel Ammann, The King of Oil. The Secret Lives of Marc Rich 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009), 92–104, 207f.; Barak 
Ravid and Jonathan Lis, “Knesset Panel on Ofer Brothers’ Iran 
Dealings Adjourns after Chair Receives ‘Secret Note’,” Haaretz, 
June 1, 2011. 
 
A more likely scenario, they believe, is that idealistic-
57  S. J. Dehghani-Firouzabadi, “Emancipating Foreign Policy: 
Critical Theory and Islamic Republic of Iran’s Foreign Policy,” 
The Iranian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 20, no. 3 (Summer 
2008), 1–26. Mahmood Sariolghalam, “Sources of Continuity 
in Iran’s Foreign Policy,” unpublished Manuscript (Presen-
tation at the National University, Singapore, May 19, 2011), 
and ibidem, “The Understanding of Power and the Function 
of Foreign Policy: A Comparison between China and Iran 
(Persian),” in Ravabet-e Khareji, vol. 3, no. 1 (Spring 2011):  
49–74. 
ideological and pragmatic-realistic phases in foreign 
policy will simply alternate.58
The following three cases illustrate how ideology 
and pragmatism or expediency (maslahat) are roughly 
balanced out in Iranian foreign policy, suggesting 
a need always to pay heed to both realpolitik and 
ideology. Conspicuous is how much foreign policy 
emphases vary depending on what is at stake: in Cen-
tral Asia and Afghanistan the Iranians are guided 
primarily by their national interests; in the nuclear 
programme the world order and strategic benefits 
play a large role; and vis-à-vis the Middle East and the 
Persian Gulf the Iranian approach is mainly motivated 
by Islamic and nationalist considerations. 
 
 
 
 
58  Hamid Ahmadi, “The Dilemma of National Interest in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran,” Iran in the 21st Century. Politics, Eco-
nomics and Conflict, ed. Homa Katouzian and Hossein Shahidi 
(London, 2008): 28–40, especially 34f. 
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Central Asia and Afghanistan: Economics and Security 
 
Iranian regional policy vis-à-vis the post-Soviet Central 
Asian states is interest-oriented and pragmatic.59
While Iran’s relations with most Central Asian and 
Caucasian states are unproblematic, a number of un-
resolved questions pose potential sources of conflict. 
These include the legal status of the Caspian Sea, on 
which authorisation to exploit important gas reserves 
depends,
 Both 
in the Karabakh conflict and in the Tajik civil war the 
Iranians proved capable of consigning ethnic, con-
fessional and ideological considerations to the back 
burner, as demonstrated by their support for Chris-
tian Armenia in the Karabakh conflict and by Iranian 
cooperation with Russia against Islamic forces in 
Tajikistan. Iran has taken a similarly pragmatic ap-
proach in its policy towards Afghanistan, even if it 
has derived support mainly from Shiite groups. 
60 and the dispute about water usage rights 
for the Helmand and Harirud Rivers, which originate 
in Afghanistan and flow into Iran.61
The most delicate relationship, however, is that 
with Azerbaijan,
 Tehran considers 
Afghanistan’s use of water higher up the rivers for 
development projects such as hydroelectric power 
stations and irrigation as an unfriendly act. 
62 since Baku accuses the Iranians of 
supporting both Armenia and Islamic extremists. The 
Iranians for their part perceive the secular nature and 
Western orientation of the Caucasus republic as a 
threat, and Baku is generally suspected by Tehran of 
encouraging separatism among Iranian Azerbaijanis. 
The Iranian leadership feels particularly provoked by 
Azerbaijan’s good relations with Israel and the co-
operation between the two states in the energy sector 
and in the fields of high technology and security.63
 
59  Qavam Sharabyani, Iranian Security and the Role of Asia in 
Central Asia (Persian) (Tehran, 2007), 314. 
 
60  Bahador Zarei, An Overview of Iranian Foreign Policy in the Geo-
politically Important Regions of the Caspian Sea and South Asia (Per-
sian) (Tehran, 2006), especially 3–57; Mark N. Katz, “Russia and 
Iran,” Middle East Policy, vol. 19, no. 3 (Autumn 2012), 54–64, 55. 
61  Nasser Saghafi-Ameri and Afsane Ahadi, Iran and the Policy 
of the “View to the East” (Persian), (Tehran, 2008), 97. 
62  Uwe Halbach, Irans nördliche Nachbarschaft. Kaukasische 
Ängste vor einer Eskalation des Atomstreits, Berlin: Stiftung Wis-
senschaft und Politik, April 2012 (SWP-Aktuell 22/2012). 
63  Michel Makinsky, “Azerbaïdjan – Israël: Des intérêts bien 
compris,” Euro-Orient 28 (2008): 97–130. 
Iran as a Geo-economic Hub 
The real aim of Iranian regional policy in the Cauca-
sus and Central Asia including Afghanistan is the eco-
nomic integration of the region of which Iran would 
then form the centre. A first step in this direction was 
the founding in 1985 of the Economic Cooperation 
Organisation (ECO). Its members include almost all 
the former Soviet republics in the Caucasus and Cen-
tral Asia (apart from Georgia and Armenia) as well as 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey. One of the ECO’s 
goals is the expansion of transport routes between 
the member states as a means of furthering trade. The 
Iranians are certainly aware of the limited possibilities 
for cooperation and the major obstacles involved in 
creating an “ECO-area”, but Tehran believes there is no 
alternative to regional cooperation.64
International Transit Routes and Gas Pipelines 
 
The Iranian leadership would like to make the coun-
try a hub for energy supply lines and transit routes for 
Europe, Russia and the Middle East on the one hand 
and Central Asia, China and the Indian subcontinent 
on the other. Thus together with Russia and India Iran 
is promoting a project to build an international north-
south railway corridor65
 
64  Elahe Kulayi, ECO and Regional Cooperation (Persian) (Teh-
ran, 2000), 103–105, and Elahe Kulayi and Mohammad 
Mo’addab, “The Status and Significance of Iran in the Energy 
Market of the ECO” (Persian), Ravabet-e Khareji, vol. 1, no. 3 
(Autumn 2009): 33–54. 
 intended to connect the Caspian 
Sea with the Persian Gulf. A similar project has been 
conceived to link the land-locked Central Asian states 
with the Persian Gulf. India seems to have the greatest 
interest in the rapid realisation of these projects, and 
65  United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific (UNESCAP), Development of the Trans-Asian Rail-
way, New York 2001 (ST/ESCAP/2182), http://www.unescap.org/ 
ttdw/Publications/TIS_pubs/pub_2182/tarnsfulltext.pdf; 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Ministry of Roads and Transpor-
tation, Railway Transportation (Tehran, 2010), http://www. 
unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/doc/2010/wp5/ECE-TRANS-WP5-
GE2-05-pres12e.pdf. 
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New Delhi recently exerted pressure on Iran to close the 
last remaining gaps in the Iranian railway network.66
More significant from an economic and strategic 
point of view, however, is the Iranian plan to win 
China, India and Europe as markets for Iranian gas. 
In 2001, towards the end of the second Khatami presi-
dency, the EU still saw the Iranian gas reserves as an 
attractive alternative to Russian gas. Indeed, the Euro-
pean Commission at that time expressly recom-
mended the expansion of energy relations.
 
67 But with 
the escalation of the nuclear issue, which by 2005 had 
come to dominate relations between Europe and Iran, 
this option was shelved. The Nabucco project, designed 
to transport Iranian and Iraqi gas via Turkey and the 
Balkans to Central Europe as an alternative to Russian 
gas provides a good illustration.68 In 2010, namely, 
Nabucco Pipelines International cancelled plans to lay a 
third pipeline along the Iranian-Turkish border, thus 
signalling the end of any further expansion plans in 
the direction of Iran for the foreseeable future.69
In the wake of these developments Iran began to 
attach greater importance to the eastern pipeline 
project (Iran–Pakistan–India, IPI) to bring Iranian gas 
to Pakistan and India. IPI is associated with hopes that 
a shared interest in regional stability would help to 
quell Indian-Pakistani rivalry (hence the original name 
Peace Pipeline). Pakistan and Iran had already signed 
preliminary agreements in 1995 and in 2003 an Ira-
nian-Pakistani working group was formed, followed 
two years later by the signing of a Memorandum 
of Understanding to include India in the project. 
Although India withdrew again in 2007, Iran and 
Pakistan concluded further agreements in 2009 and 
2010.
 
70
 
66  Sandeep Diksheet, “Despite U.S. Opposition, Iran to Be 
Transport Hub for North-South Corridor,” The Hindu, May 31, 
2012; Debidatta Aurobinda Mahaprata, “The North South 
Corridor: Prospects of Mulitlateral Trade in Eurasia,” in Russia 
and India Report, March 14, 2012; Sokhbet Mamedov, “The Ira-
nian Project,” Russia and India Report, February 21, 2011. 
 The Indian decision to withdraw from the 
67  European Commission, Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament and the Council – EU Relations with the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, COM (2001)71 final, Brussels, February 
7, 2001. 
68  Heinz Kramer, Die Türkei als Energiedrehscheibe. Wunschtraum 
und Wirklichkeit, SWP-Studie 9/2010 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, April 2010), 20–25 and 31–33. 
69  See the press released by Nabucco Gas-Pipeline: “Nabucco: 
Modification of Feeder Line Concept,” August 23, 2010, http:// 
www.nabucco-pipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en/press/ 
NewsText?p_item_id=8E79E5BF557DCC2DE040A8C0010178CA. 
70  See the introduction to the collection of material by Noor 
ul Haq and Muhammad Nawaz Khan, Iran-Pakistan Peace Pipe-
project is generally attributed to pressure from the 
United States. However, Iranian diplomats believe that 
India was simply trying to bring down the price of 
Iranian gas, leading Tehran to hope that India will 
rejoin the project at some point.71
Economic Strategy 
 
The importance of the transit routes and gas pipelines 
for the economic future of Iran should not be under-
estimated. How much store Tehran sets by this real-
politik based on economic interests is demonstrated 
by an economic strategy paper envisaging Iran as a re-
liable energy supplier of the future – the only strategy 
paper Iran has ever formulated as a binding docu-
ment.72 The principles articulated in the “20-Year Per-
spective of the Islamic Republic of Iran” are not free 
of ideological rhetoric,73
Afghanistan 
 yet the central message is an 
economic one, thus for the first time putting the goals 
of growth and prosperity on a par with the radical 
ideals laid down as the guiding principles of the con-
stitution. This signifies more than just pragmatism or 
expediency (maslahat), for which ideological positions 
would not need to be forfeited, and constitutes a real 
prioritisation of national interests over revolutionary 
axioms in foreign policy. Iran’s ambitions to expand 
transport routes and gas pipelines is, however, only 
possible in a secure environment. Here Iranian inter-
ests converge with those of the West, above all the 
United States, which has just as little to gain from cha-
os and the failure of states in the region as Iran does. 
This convergence of interests was certainly strong 
enough for the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate 
with the United States against the Taliban around the 
turn of the year 2001/02. Their cooperation was sus-
 
line (Islamabad, 2010), http://ipripak.org/factfiles/ff124.pdf; 
Abbas Maleki, Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline: Is It a Peace Pipeline? 
Audit of the Conventional Wisdom (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Center for International Studies, September 2007). 
71  “India Considering Returning to Iranian Gas,” Tehran 
Times, April 9, 2012. 
72  Document of the 20-Year Strategy (Persian), http://www. 
dolat.ir/PDF/20years.pdf. 
73  A critical analysis of this programme is offered by Jahan-
gir Amuzegar, “Iran’s 20-years Economic Perspective,” Middle 
East Policy, vol. 16, no. 3 (Autumn 2009): 41–57. 
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pended, however, following President Bush’s famous 
State of the Union speech, in which he described Iran 
as part of an “axis of evil”. Even then, though, Iran 
continued to be involved in the Afghanistan question 
as an indirect cooperation partner of the West, par-
ticipating in the most important international forums 
for the stabilisation of Afghanistan. To this end Iran 
has since 2011 been an active member of the Istanbul 
Process, which builds on the “Kabul Declaration of 
Good Neighbourly Relations” from the year 200274 and 
includes all of Afghanistan’s neighbours. At the “Heart 
of Asia” ministers’ conference in Kabul in June 2012 
the participants in the Istanbul Process75 agreed on a 
series of confidence-building measures in which inter-
ested states can participate. These include measures 
for disaster protection, combating terrorism, combat-
ing the drugs trade, creating a joint chamber of com-
merce, economic expansion, and regional infrastruc-
ture, education and training projects, hence covering 
the Iranians’ most important interests in Afghanistan. 
Iran is already one of the biggest investors in Afgha-
nistan and one of its chief trading partners. Added to 
this are Iranian soft powers in the sphere of education, 
primarily for Shiite and Persian-speaking groups.76
Tehran is also seeking to improve its bilateral rela-
tions with Afghanistan. The two states work closely 
together on the refugee issue
 
Tehran’s cultural influence is exerted less through 
state institutions than through religious channels; 
most educational facilities are run by Qom clergy who 
have already built up local circles of support allowing 
Iranian sponsors to remain in the background. 
77
 
74  Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Declaration of the Istanbul Process on Regional Security and 
Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan, November 3, 
2011, http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/4598. 
 and in fighting the 
drugs trade, and many agreements have already been 
signed in these fields. Iran would like to intensify 
cooperation on security policy still further in order to 
75  “Afghanistan Hosts Second ‘Heart of Asia’ Conference,” 
Tolonews, June 14, 2012; “Heart of Asia” Ministerial 
Conference, Declaration (Kabul, June 14, 2012), http:// 
www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/620128/ 
publicationFile/169405/120612-HeartOfAsia-
Konferenzerklaerung.pdf. 
76  Frederick W. Kagan et al., Iranian Influence in the Levant, 
Egypt, Iraq, and Afghanistan, (Washington, D.C.: The American 
Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War, 
May 2012), 79–81. 
77  On the Afghan refugee problem see Banafsheh Sahm-Gis, 
“Uninvited Guests. This Hospitality Has Been Going on for 31 
Years!” (Persian), Hamshahri-Mah (October 2010): 112–17. 
prevent a comeback of the Taliban and other similarly 
radical Sunni groups.78
Tehran tries to respond to pressure in Afghanistan 
with counter-pressure, for example in the form of 
IRGC, specifically the Qods brigade. This strategy in-
cludes supplying arms to anti-Western groups, includ-
ing to former members of the Taliban, a measure with 
which Iran responded to the establishment of Western 
contacts with Taliban groups.
 So far this has been prevented 
by the United States, which strives to impose political 
limits on the Afghans in their relationship with Iran. 
79 Iranian arms supplies 
as a rule remain below a certain provocation thresh-
old; they do not, for example, include ground-to-air 
missiles, while control of the supplies ensures a cer-
tain predictability.80
This situation will not change even after the NATO 
mission to Afghanistan ends as planned in 2014, since 
several thousand US soldiers will remain stationed 
there. With this in mind, Western analysts and politi-
cians have repeatedly called for a Western-Iranian 
partnership on the Afghanistan issue.
 Basically this is about sending 
political signals to the Americans, who are suspected 
by Tehran of using Afghanistan to support radical 
Sunni separatists in eastern Iran, rather than about 
building strategic partnerships. Ultimately, neither 
the Iranians nor the Americans are in a position to 
drive the other out of Afghanistan. 
81
 
 The Iranians 
already demonstrated in 2001/02 that they are capable 
of engaging in constructive cooperation with the 
West. Whether they are prepared to do this again 
depends on many factors, including progress on the 
nuclear issue, which currently dominates Iranian 
relations with the West. 
 
 
78  Saghafi-Ameri and Ahadi, Iran and the Policy of the “View to 
the East” (see note 61), 94–96. 
79  Emma Graham-Harrison, “Taliban Suspend Talks with 
US as Karzai Calls for Troops to Leave Village,” The Guardian, 
March 15, 2012; Julian Borger, “Taliban to Open Political 
Office in Qatar,” The Guardian, January 3, 2012. 
80  The following is based on Eric Parks, Iranian Weapons 
Smuggling Activities in Afghanistan (unclassified) (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organi-
zation [JIEDDO], September 3, 2009), 2–5, http://info. 
publicintelligence.net/JIEDDO-IranWeaponsSmuggling.pdf. 
81  Markus Potzel, Iran und der Westen. Chancen für gemeinsames 
Handeln in Afghanistan? SWP-Studie 16/2010 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2010); Mir H. Sadat and James 
P. Hughes, “U.S.-Iranian Engagement through Afghanistan,” 
Middle East Policy, vol. 17, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 31–51. 
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Third World Rhetoric and Power Projections: 
Iran’s Nuclear Program 
 
The Iranian elites regard nuclear technology as the 
most important and most modern form of technology. 
This typically Third World attitude to technology has 
formed the basis for the Iranian negotiating position 
with the E3 (Great Britain, France, and Germany) and 
more recently with the E3+3 (plus USA, China and 
Russia) as well. In order to win backing for its position 
both internally and in the foreign policy arena, Teh-
ran emphasises the peaceful nature of the Iranian 
nuclear program and the importance of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Organisation (IAEA) under 
whose auspices Iran was for a long time able to count 
on the support of many developing countries. Above 
all, Iran interprets the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty as meaning that it has an inalienable “right to 
the nuclear fuel cycle”,82 in other words to the tech-
nology that is a prerequisite for a nuclear weapons 
programme.83
“Nuclear Justice” 
 This is the interpretation espoused by 
most Third World countries, but few of them go so far 
as to risk an international confrontation. 
With respect to the nuclear issue Iran sees itself as 
a champion of the Third World, which “in reality” 
constitutes a majority in the international commu-
nity.84 Supreme Leader Khamenei asserted in January 
2007 in a programmatic speech in Mashhad85
 
82  For a summary of the Iranian position see Nasser Saghafi-
Ameri, “Iran: The Paradigm of ‘Non-Weapon Nuclear States 
(NWNS)’,” (Tehran: IMESS, September 16, 2012), http://en. 
merc.ir/default.aspx?tabid=98&ArticleId=461. 
 that 
Iran is not isolated, as the United States claims. 
83  Shahram Chubin expressly emphasised this point in Iran’s 
Nuclear Ambitions (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 
2006). Oli Heinonen, “The Rocky Road of Nuclear Diplomacy 
with Iran,” Arms Control Today, vol. 42, no. 6 (July/August 
2012), 8–9. 
84  Typical of this way of thinking is the following article: 
Rasul Sanayi-Rad, “Reasons for the West’s Position against the 
Nuclear Programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran” (Persian), 
Misaq-e Basij-e Motakhassesin (April 13, 2011): 88–113. 
85  Khamenei’s speech in January 2007; the video recording 
with English subtitles can be accessed under http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=CdC5NB-ait0. 
Rather, he said that the “absolute majority of states” – 
referring to the non-aligned and Islamic states – wel-
comed Iran’s nuclear enrichment program and ad-
mired Iran’s courage in trying to wrest the technology 
for producing “nuclear energy from the firm grip of a 
small group of arrogant powers”. 
Apart from the obvious attempt to argue away 
Iran’s de facto isolation, this position certainly illus-
trates a fundamental view of the world that the Ira-
nian elite shares with large parts of the population. 
Primarily it is about “standing firm” and preventing 
rights to which Iran is entitled and the achievements 
of its own scientists being denied. This is why Iran 
insists on its right to enrich uranium and to use tech-
nology that it has itself created up till now, a position 
in which it feels confirmed by the “true” international 
community.86 Until now Tehran has simply taken the 
support of major Third World states such as India 
and Brazil for granted, despite changing parameters. 
When the West tried to woo the non-aligned states, 
the clear dividing line in voting on the Board of Gov-
ernors of the IAEA between the “arrogant nuclear 
powers“ and the Third World, whose standard-bearer 
Iran had declared itself, ceased to exist for a time.87 
Other states used Iran’s stubbornness to promote their 
own national interests. India, for example, reached a 
nuclear agreement with the United States in 2008.88
Yet since 2006 the Iranian nuclear dossier has been 
with the Security Council, and negotiations are being 
conducted with the EU, or to be more precise under 
the auspices of the E3+3 format. Not only have the 
members of this format kept a unified position but 
they have initiated a series of sanctions, which via UN 
Resolution 1929 of June 2010, have been tightened 
almost to the point of an economic war. 
 
A few months before the resolution was issued 
Brazil and Turkey launched an initiative on the 
 
86  “Iran Will Not Concede Its Right to Uranium Enrichment 
Up to 20 Percent” (Persian), Fararu, March 25, 2012. 
87  Heisbourg, Iran, le choix des armes? (see note 51), 110. 
88  Saghafi-Ameri and Ahadi, Iran and the Policy of the “View 
to the East” (see note 61), 119–23 and 274–76. For an official 
American portrayal see Geoffrey Pyatt, “Taking Stock of 
the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” September 30, 2011, http://www. 
state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2011/174883.htm. 
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23 
nuclear question that constituted one of the most ex-
plicit attempts to date to play the Third World card on 
the international stage. Opinions differ about how 
exactly this initiative came about.89 But one of the 
reasons why it failed was that it was debated in public, 
prompting the Iranian leadership to turn this diplo-
matic foray into an anti-imperialist gesture. In so 
doing Tehran not only deliberately ignored the sen-
sibilities of the Europeans involved in the E3+3 dia-
logue, but also risked bruising the status- and repu-
tation-conscious states China and Russia, which as 
permanent members of the World Security Council 
were of course also responsible for the policy of sanc-
tions. What is more, Iran ultimately misunderstood 
the intentions of the governments in Ankara and 
Brasilia, both of which were seeking to establish their 
countries as emerging powers by casting themselves 
as modern constructive actors on the world political 
scene whose diplomacy would succeed where that of 
the Europeans failed.90
After the failure of this mediation attempt in 2010, 
Iran seemed to have become even more isolated politi-
cally. That changed with the Declaration of Tehran in 
August 2012
 
91 in which the non-aligned states express-
ly declared their support for the right of all states, 
including Iran, to use nuclear enrichment technology. 
While the United States sharply criticised the declara-
tion,92
 
89  On this see Meir Javedanfar, “What the Iran Deal Is 
Missing,” The Diplomat, May 18, 2010. 
 Tehran received further support during the UN 
General Assembly from Venezuela and – surprisingly – 
from Argentina. Argentinean Foreign Minister Timer-
man stated that the best way to combat proliferation 
was total nuclear disarmament and that attempts to 
combat nuclear terrorism should not be used to re-
strict the legitimate ambitions of sovereign states to 
possess nuclear energy and achieve nuclear indepen-
dence. Although it is unlikely that the Argentine-
Iranian nuclear cooperation of the 1980s and 1990s 
will be resumed, this episode is nonetheless signifi-
90  Kadir Üstün, “Turkey’s Iran Policy: Between Diplomacy 
and Sanctions,” Insight Turkey 12, vol. 3 (Summer 2010): 19–26. 
91  Tehran Declaration. The Declaration of the XVI Summit of Heads 
of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, NAM 2012, 
Doc. 7 (Tehran, August 30/31, 2012) http://nam.gov.ir/Portal/ 
File/ShowFile.aspx?ID=6d1ea997-6620-465d-881c-e4f64970415b; 
Alain Frachon, “La ‘bombe’ iranienne et le sommet de Téhè-
ran,” Le Monde, September 14, 2012. 
92  David Albright and Andrea Stricker, “NAM Countries 
Hypocritical on Iran,” The Iran Primer (blog), September 7, 
2012, http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2012/sep/07/nam-
countries-hypocritical-iran. 
cant, because Tehran sees its position confirmed inter-
nationally by the stance taken by Argentina and the 
non-aligned countries on the nuclear question and 
will thus enter the next round of E3+3 negotiations 
with renewed self-confidence.93
Strategic Aspects 
 
Harnessing the Third World discourse to argue in 
favour of the Iranian nuclear program serves above all 
to legitimate this program, both internally and inter-
nationally. A belief in progress and energy policy con-
siderations are not, however, in themselves sufficient 
to justify the level of international confrontation Iran 
is prepared to engage in to defend its projects. The 
main reason Iran is sticking to this position is because 
of the strategic implications of what in the official 
language is termed a “peaceful nuclear energy pro-
gram”. 
In December 2001 Ayatollah Rafsanjani speculated 
that putting nuclear warheads in the hands of Mus-
lims would thwart the “strategy of the imperialists”, 
since one warhead would be sufficient to wipe out 
Israel, whereas in the event of a counterstrike the 
Islamic world would “only” suffer damage.94
 
93  “Iran’s Position in Dialogue with 5+1 Has Changed since 
NAM Summit,” Mehr News Agency, September 15, 2012. 
 This did 
not necessarily mean Rafsanjani was calling for an 
Iranian atomic bomb. His statement revealed, how-
ever, that the strategic goal Iran was pursuing with 
its nuclear activities was to achieve nuclear parity 
with Israel, whereby the Muslim world with its demo-
graphic potential and strategic significance would 
have the upper hand. In January 2010 parliamentary 
speaker Larijani stated openly that the Iranian nuclear 
programme was intended not only to supply Iran with 
energy but also to enhance its prestige in the region. 
Finally we should recall that when Iran re-embarked 
on a nuclear programme in the early 1990s it did so in 
a bid to pacify the military, which, following the end 
of the war with Iraq, was having to contend with the 
consequences of demobilisation and a sinking defence 
budget. A rudimentary nuclear program is after all 
cheaper than a systematic modernisation of the entire 
armed forces. This temporal coincidence fuelled the 
94  Michael Eisenstadt, “Deter and Contain: Dealing with 
a Nuclear Iran,” in Getting Ready for a Nuclear-ready Iran, ed. 
Patrick Clawson and Henry Sokolski (Washington, D.C.: 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2005): 225–55 (232). 
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suspicion that the programme did indeed have a mili-
tary dimension.95
Nowadays the consensus among researchers is that 
Iran is primarily striving for nuclear weapons capa-
bility, but there is still disagreement about whether 
it is planning to actually acquire nuclear weapons. 
Most researchers believe this is not the case, because 
nuclear weapons capability would be sufficient to earn 
Tehran a level of prestige and influence vis-à-vis the 
Arab Gulf States that would force them to recognise 
Iran as a “virtual nuclear power”.
 
96 This would, how-
ever, still not be sufficient to achieve the desired stra-
tegic parity with Israel,97 a goal that could be more 
easily reached via multilateral disarmament. For this 
reason Iran is supporting all efforts to establish a 
weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle 
East, no matter whether this is initiated by Egypt, the 
Arab League or certain member states of the EU. This 
is the context in which we should view Tehran’s sup-
port for the Egyptian demand that Israel join the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and allow its nuclear 
facilities to be inspected by the IAEA. Iran thus sets 
great store by not acting alone but in an international 
framework, as the final communiqué of the non-
aligned conference signalled.98 In order to underscore 
their own credibility, the Iranians in 2010 and 2011 
organised two disarmament conferences in Tehran 
entitled “Nuclear energy for everyone, nuclear weap-
ons for no one”. In the West these conferences were 
largely ignored, but in the region and among the non-
aligned states they prompted a degree of interest. At 
the same time, the Iranians repeatedly emphasise the 
important of a fatwa issued by Khamenei that would 
prohibit the production, storage and deployment of 
nuclear weapons. The West is sceptical about the im-
pact of a religious decree of this kind,99
 
95  Michael Eisenstadt, “The Armed Forces of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran: An Assessment,” Middle East Review of Inter-
national Affairs, vol. 5, no. 1 (March 2001): 13–30. 
 especially as 
its significance would be negligible in terms of inter-
national law. 
96  On the problem of virtual nuclear capacity see Sukeyuki 
Ichimasa, “The Concept of Virtual Nuclear Arsenals and ‘A 
World without Nuclear Weapons’,” NIDS Journal of Defense and 
Security, vol. 13, no. 1 (December 2012): 23–37. 
97  See Article 174 of the Final Document (see note 47). 
98  See ibid., Articles 147–224. 
99  On this see Michael Eisenstadt and Mehdi Khalaji, Nuclear 
Fatwa. Religion and Politics in Iran’s Proliferation Strategy, Policy 
Focus 115 (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, September 2011). 
Ultimately Iran is pursuing a double strategy: while 
steadily expanding its own nuclear programme to 
the point of nuclear weapons capability, thus ensur-
ing itself breakout capability, it supports any measure 
suitable for containing the Israeli nuclear program. 
Remaining a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty is a prerequisite for both goals: to increase the 
diplomatic pressure on Israel and to secure and legit-
imise its own programme through cooperation with 
the IAEA. In a Middle East free of weapons of mass 
destruction the “virtual nuclear power” Iran would 
then have sufficient weight to bolster its claim for 
regional leadership. 
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Ideological and Strategic Confrontations in the Middle East 
 
Iranian Middle Eastern policy focuses on three main 
regions: Iraq, the Persian Gulf and the Levant. In all 
three cases ideological and strategic considerations 
are intertwined, but the emphasis is different in each. 
With respect to Israel and Palestine the ideological 
aspect dominates (political Islam, Third World radi-
calism), whereas vis-à-vis Iraq Iran chiefly pursues the 
strategic goal of ensuring that Baghdad never again 
wages war against it. In the Persian Gulf Iran sees it-
self as a hegemon, which inevitably brings Tehran into 
conflict with the other Gulf powers, particularly Saudi 
Arabia (and until 2003 with Iraq too), and with the 
United States. 
Iran’s “Strategic Vision” and Its Limits 
Currently we know of no official document in which 
Iran analyses the various strategic challenges and 
responds to them with a corresponding vision.100 But 
even without such a document it is possible to discern 
the contours of a vision guided by central ideological, 
security and interest-led aspects.101
Like many revolutionary regimes, Iranian decision-
makers extrapolate their own experiences onto the 
region. They assume, in other words, that the cultural 
gap between the pro-Western or Westernised elites 
and the general population is so great that pro-West-
ern regimes will either be voted out in free elections 
or ousted through revolutions. The governments that 
would come to power subsequently would rely less on 
the Western elites and in the medium term break with 
them entirely. National interests and public opinion 
would hence play a greater role for the future policy 
 It is determined 
chiefly by two elements: the long-term goal of getting 
the United States to leave the region and the paradigm 
that Israel is an illegitimate state. 
 
100  A series of confidential or secret documents must, how-
ever, exist, as suggested by Asgari, “Iran’s Defense Diplomacy” 
(see note 7), passim. 
101  See Walter Posch, “The Arab Spring: A Warm Welcome 
from Tehran,” Geopoliticia, vol. 43 (Autumn–Winter 2011),  
72–78. 
of these countries than it has up to now, as would 
political Islam.102
These changes would in turn have far-reaching 
strategic consequences, for the disappearance of pro-
Western Arab governments would step up the political 
and diplomatic pressure on Israel and the United 
States. The latter would then find it increasingly dif-
ficult to maintain a presence in the region and would 
at some point have to drastically decrease its troops 
stationed there or even withdraw altogether. Israel, 
the “Zionist regime”, would in the long term disap-
pear like all the other regimes, since the pressure on 
the Arab majority in mandate Palestine (i.e. Israel and 
the occupied territories) could not be maintained 
indefinitely. The end of the Apartheid regime in South 
Africa and the repatriation of Algerian French could 
be cited as historical precedents in this connection. 
 
A peaceful “South-South integration” (in other 
words economic and political cooperation between 
the states in the region without Western interference) 
with an Islamic flavour would be the natural conclu-
sion of such a development. Of course, the interests of 
these states would still differ from those of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, but the benefits – initially economic 
and later political and security – of such regional 
integration would soon become evident. As one of the 
largest and most populous countries in the region 
Iran would, according to its own vision, without much 
ado, continue to play an important role and ideally 
assume the leadership. All Iran would have to do 
would be to stand firm, especially on the Palestinian 
question and on the nuclear programme. The first 
would justify Iran’s claim to lead the Islamic world, 
the second would make Tehran the hegemon of the 
Persian Gulf. 
Iran’s Shiite identity and military-strategic realities 
in the Persian Gulf impose limits on this vision, how-
ever. 
 
102  Ghadir Nasri, “The Nature of Regime Change in the 
Arab World,” Discourse. An Iranian Quarterly, vol. 10, nos. 1–2 
(Winter–Spring 2012): 61–96 (80–83); Amir-Mohammad Haji-
Yousefi, “Iran and the 2011 Arab Revolutions: Perceptions 
and Actions,” Discourse. An Iranian Quarterly vol. 10, nos. 1–2 
(Winter–Spring 2012): 23–60 (26–33). 
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The Persian Gulf 
The relationship of the Arab monarchies of the Persian 
Gulf to the Islamic Republic of Iran is characterised by 
mistrust – a mistrust of Iranian nationalism and a mis-
trust rooted in the fear that Iran will exert a subver-
sive influence on the Shiites in the region. Iran has 
already tried to do this once – and failed. During the 
1980s Iran sought to mobilise the Shiites in the Middle 
East and Gulf regions for its own foreign policy pur-
poses, but under President Mohammad Khatami the 
Iranian leadership finally gave up this policy, there-
after assigning less importance to the Shiite factor in 
bilateral relations with the Gulf states. 
Confession-neutral Foreign Policy and Nationalism 
Bloody confrontations between the confessions in 
neighbouring Pakistan and the rise of Al-Qaida and 
similar groups in the late 1990s have bolstered Teh-
ran’s pursuit of a new “confession-neutral” foreign 
policy. This was severely put to the test in Bahrain in 
2011. Initially Tehran showed restraint during the 
mass protests in the small island state in spring 2011, 
endeavouring not to endanger relations with the King 
of Bahrain and to strengthen his position vis-à-vis the 
pro-Saudi prime minister. Even after the Saudis in-
vaded Bahrain, Iranian diplomats avoided interpreting 
events in confessional terms. When the human rights 
situation in Bahrain worsened, Iran called for a UN 
resolution in favour of the oppressed Shiites but 
refrained from taking any concrete political steps.103
Another reason for the Arab mistrust was the fact 
that although Tehran had reduced the confessional 
factor in its Gulf policy, it still exhibited Iranian na-
tionalism and once again behaved like a Persian super-
power in the Gulf region. The conflict about what the 
correct name of the “Persian” Gulf should be, which 
assumed international dimensions, allowed Iran to 
project an image internally and vis-à-vis Iranians in 
exile as the protector and guarantor of national hon-
our and of the country’s territorial integrity. Iran’s 
occupation of the Tunb-Islands (Greater and Lesser 
 
Nevertheless, with respect to Bahrain Iran’s confes-
sion-neutral policy can be considered to have failed, 
since Tehran has not managed to assuage the fears 
of Arab leaders that Iran might play the “Shiite card”. 
 
103  “Massacre of Bahrein’s Shiites and the Necessity of a 
UN-Resolution” (Persian), Alef, March 17, 2011. 
Tunb and Abu Musa) in 1992 was motivated by stra-
tegic considerations but also served to underline 
Iran’s power and strength. Since then the dispute over 
the islands has strained Iran’s relationship with the 
United Arab Emirates and with the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, although there has been some small measure 
of detente over the past two years.104
Iran and the Fifth Fleet 
 
The chief and most explosive conflict in the Gulf 
region, however, is that between Iran and the United 
States, represented by the US Fifth Fleet. The US pres-
ence in the Persian Gulf is strategically motivated and 
serves to safeguard the flow of oil from the region, to 
protect the United States’ Arab allies and to prevent 
the establishment of another hegemonial power.105 To 
this end the United States has concluded a number of 
bilateral security treaties with the Arab Gulf states, 
which neither commit the United States to defending 
these states nor contain any provisions that would 
allow it to attack third party states.106 This explains 
why many states in the region have also concluded 
security agreements with the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
for example, Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq and Oman. Oman 
indisputably has the best relationship with Iran and 
has used this on repeated occasions to mediate 
between Washington and Tehran.107 The bilateral 
agreements between Iran and its neighbours are not 
strategic alliances, but they do testify to shared secu-
rity interests and thus run counter to the US policy 
of isolating Iran108 ­ as in the case of Iraq. This is not 
actually a defence alliance, even if Tehran likes to 
perceive it as such,109
 
104  Kenneth Katzman, The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for 
U.S. Policy, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service 
(CRS), Dezember 2011 (CRS Report for Congress RS21852), 13–14. 
 but an important agreement 
regulating border traffic and border security. 
105  See Gary Sick, “The United States and the Persian Gulf 
in the Twentieth Century,” in The Persian Gulf in History, ed. 
Lawrence G. Potter (New York, 2009): 295–310. 
106  Kenneth Katzman, The Persian Gulf States, Post-War Issues 
for U.S. Policy, CRS Report for Congress RL31533 (Washington, 
D.C.: CRS, July 2003), 18–19. 
107  Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, “Oman’s Foreign Policy in the Twenty 
First Century,” Middle East Policy 17, vol. 1 (Spring 2010): 99–114. 
108  Peter Alsis, Marissa Allison, and Anthony H. Cordesman, 
U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition in the Gulf States and Yemen 
(Washington, D.C.: CSIS, March 16, 2012), 5. 
109  “Fear in the West of the Founding of Defence Alliance be-
tween Iraq and Iran” (Persian), October 6, 2012, http://www.598.ir. 
The “Axis of Resistance” and the Battle for Palestine 
SWP Berlin 
The Making of Iranian Foreign Policy 
April 2013 
 
 
 
27 
The United States has been more successful with 
economic sanctions – its intensification of cooper-
ation with the United Arab Emirates, for example, 
clearly works to the detriment of Iran. In particular 
the change in the position of Dubai, which – although 
located on the opposite shore of the Persian Gulf – 
had become Iran’s most important trading centre,110
With the demise of Iraq as the most important 
regional actor the United States and Iran now find 
themselves face-to-face in the Persian Gulf. Iran 
naturally sees the military presence of the Americans 
as a threat, but it is managing to live with the situa-
tion by allowing operational level contacts between 
the Iranian Navy and the US Fifth Fleet (bridge-to-
bridge contact). Iran nevertheless rejects the formali-
sation of these contacts that the United States is cal-
ling for, since in Tehran’s view this would be tanta-
mount to a recognition of US hegemony.
 
has increased pressure on Iran. The Emirate of 
Dubai has recently started to apply sanctions in 
the finance sector. 
111 Incidents 
therefore occur at regular intervals in the Persian 
Gulf (e.g., August 2007, 2012).112
The “Axis of Resistance” and the 
Battle for Palestine 
 Each time Iran em-
phasises its will to defend itself, while the United 
States threatens to keep open the Straits of Hormoz 
by armed force if necessary. So far these crises have 
always ended peacefully, but the risk of escalation 
remains. Tehran can be happy with the status quo 
as long as it does not force it to come to a strategic 
understanding with Washington. But every time there 
is a Hormoz crisis it becomes evident for the whole 
world to see that Iran is still the leading power in the 
Persian Gulf after the United States. 
As a Shiite and Persian country, Iran has few points 
of contact with the Levant, the only exception being 
the Shiites in Lebanon. This is why Tehran emphasises 
is role as a revolutionary Islamic state vis-à-vis the 
 
110  According to Hourcade, Géopolitique de l’Iran (see note 1), 191. 
111  Sascha Albrecht and Walter Posch, Sabre-Rattling in the Per-
sian Gulf. Legal and Military Aspects of the Ideological Confrontation 
between Iran and the United States, SWP-Comments 14/2012 (Ber-
lin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2012). 
112  Walter Posch, “Provoking an Agreement? The Hormuz 
Incident Revisited,” in Leadership in Challenging Situations, ed. 
Harald Haas, Franz Kernic, and Andrea Plaschke (Frankfurt, 
2012): 267–75. 
Middle East and offers itself to the Palestinians as a 
protector or at least as a strategic partner. The so-
called “axis of resistance” against Israel and the West 
was an ideological construct designed to focus the 
strategic interests of different actors towards a single 
goal, namely the fight against Israel. A central motive 
for the invocation of such an alliance is the conviction 
of the Iranian leadership that those regimes and 
movements that continue to oppose Israel enjoy the 
greatest popular legitimacy. De facto this means an 
alliance between Iran, Syria, the Shiite Lebanese party 
Hezbollah and various (Sunni) Palestinian groups, 
above all Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. 
Relations between Iran and Syria are rooted in a 
strategic alliance against Saddam Hussein. Following 
the overthrow of the Iraqi dictator in 2003 the two 
partners became even closer.113 The “axis of resis-
tance” served Damascus as a way to maintain pressure 
on Israel with respect to the Golan Heights and to 
mitigate its own isolation. Intelligence cooperation be-
tween Iran and Syria is directed above all against Iraq, 
Lebanon and the activities of the Kurdish PKK. Iran for 
its part has within the alliance often proved willing 
to mediate in the difficult relationship between the 
Syrians and Hezbollah.114
The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is the only Pales-
tinian group that identifies with the Islamic revolu-
tion in Iran.
 And contacts with Islamic 
Jihad have run via both Damascus and Beirut. 
115
Unlike Hezbollah Iran has never really had a close 
relationship of trust with Hamas.
 Its relations with Tehran are therefore 
close, and Iran is probably their only sponsor. From 
this most observers conclude that the Iranians have 
the greatest influence on this group. During the 
Syrian crisis the leadership of PIJ, however, decided 
like Hamas to leave Damascus. 
116
 
113  Jubin M. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran. Diplomatic Alliance and 
Power Politics in the Middle East, New York 2006; Chehabi, “Iran 
and Lebanon” (see note 
 The Hamas leader-
ship has always been aware of its importance for Iran 
and has used its visits to Tehran mainly to embarrass 
the Arab financers from the Gulf region. Yet from an 
ideological point of view the Islamic Republic of Iran 
28), 287–308. 
114  Olfa Lamloum, “La Syrie et le Hezbollah” (see note 29), 
93–108; Naim Qassem, Hizbullah. The Story from Within (London, 
2005), 239–43. 
115  Jim Zanotti, The Palestinians. Background and US Relations, 
CRS Report for Congress RL34074 (Washington, D.C.: CRS, 
August 2012), 25. 
116  Jim Zanotti, HAMAS, Background and Issues for Congress, CRS 
Report for Congress R41514 (Washington, D.C.: CRS, Decem-
ber 2010), 22, 23. 
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has no role to play for Hamas, although the Iranians 
would have welcomed this.117 The fact that the Pales-
tinian organisations had a second big sponsor in Syria 
must have diminished Tehran’s influence still further. 
For Hamas Iran has remained mainly of interest as a 
supplier of arms, a financer and a counterweight to 
the Arab states, whereas Tehran has sought through 
its support for Hamas to legitimise itself as an Islamic 
protector in the Levant.118
Given this major divergence in interests, the ques-
tion arises of whether the “axis of resistance” was ac-
tually more propaganda than reality. It was certain-
ly not sufficient to bring about military solidarity 
between the partners of the axis either in 2006 (battles 
between Israel and the Hezbollah) or in 2008 and 2012 
(Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip) and was 
really only successful as a loose alliance of states and 
organisations that formed a political opposition to 
Saudi-Arabia. 
 
Strategic Confrontations during the 
Arab Spring 
The changes that took place in the wake of the Arab 
Spring at the turn of the year 2010/11 seemed to con-
firm the Iranian vision of the long-term development 
of the region (see above, p. 25): in Tunisia, Egypt and 
Libya pro-Western regimes were deposed and Islamic 
forces came to power. The Iranians placed great hopes 
on Egypt, which Tehran sees as a future partner. The 
fact that Cairo gave an Iranian warship permission to 
sail through the Suez Canal into the eastern Mediter-
ranean was evaluated as a major success. 
The Saudi Backlash and the Rift with Turkey 
The backlash came in Bahrain in March 2011. The 
intervention of the troops of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council led by Saudi Arabia (“Peninsula Shield”) in the 
small island state represented the culmination of a 
long series of measures taken by Saudi Arabia to push 
back Iranian influence in the region. These had in-
cluded activities in the sphere of political communi-
cation such as the propagation of a “Shiite crescent” 
 
117  Javad Al-Hamd and Ayad Bargouthi (eds.), An Overview of 
the Political Thinking of the Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine 
(HAMAS), 1987–1996 (translated from Arabic into Persian by 
Seyyed Hoseyn Mousavi) (Tehran, 1997). 
118  Zanotti, The Palestinians (see note 115), 12, 15. 
consisting of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas, 
aiming to delegitimise or render obsolete Iranian 
rhetoric about the “axis of resistance” as well as state-
ments by high-up Saudis expressly advocating military 
steps against Iran or accusing Tehran of being respon-
sible for all conflicts in the region. It also included the 
rejection of Iraqi Premier Maleki, who is regarded as 
sympathising with Iran, and finally the support for 
Sunni rebels in Iraq.119
The Iranian leadership underestimated both the 
threat perception of the Saudis in Bahrain and their 
determination to act without American approval. 
With this operation the Saudis managed to stand up 
to Iran as the regional power and to present it as a 
protector of the Shiites. As Tehran visibly sought a de-
escalation, Foreign Minister Salehi emphasised that 
good relations with Saudi Arabia and Turkey were a 
priority for Iran. 
 
Nevertheless, bilateral relations with Turkey deteri-
orated during 2011. In the spring of that year Turkish 
Prime Minister Erdogan had condemned the Saudi 
intervention in Bahrain even more harshly than the 
Iranians. In retrospect the Turkish change of heart 
appears less surprising. Although Turkish-Iranian rela-
tions had undergone a continual improvement since 
2002, this was soon tempered by the realisation that 
while Turkey was fundamentally oriented towards the 
West, the Iranians pursued an anti-Western revolution-
ary line.120 The deployment of the NATO missile detec-
tion and radar tracking system in Turkey and the 
strange circumstances surrounding the arrest and 
release of PKK leader Murat Karayilan by Iranian secu-
rity forces in September 2011 led to a rapid deteriora-
tion of the relationship.121
Escalation in Syria 
 The real problem, however, 
was the two countries’ divergent stances on Syria. 
When the human-rights situation in Syria took a 
dramatic turn for the worse, Turkey sided against 
the Assad regime while Iran continued to back it. 
The change in the Turkish position was the first sign 
that Tehran stood alone in the region in its support 
 
119  Helene Cooper, “Saudis’ Role in Iraq Frustrates U.S. Offi-
cials,” The New York Times, July 27, 2007. 
120  Bayram Sinkaya, “Rationalization of Turkey-Iran Rela-
tions: Prospects and Limits,” Insight Turkey, vol. 14, no. 2 
(2012): 137–56. 
121  “Irans PKK-Answer to Bülent Arinc” (Turkish), Cumhuriyet, 
August 13, 2012. 
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for the Syrian regime. The suspension of Syrian mem-
bership in the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation 
(OIC) in August 2012 and the impossibility of getting 
a pro-Syrian declaration passed at the non-aligned 
conference strengthened this impression of isolation. 
Even worse for Iran, however, was the destruction of 
a cherished political paradigm. The strategic concept 
of the “axis of resistance” was based, as mentioned 
above, on the notion that anti-Zionist regimes enjoy 
broad support in the population, which was now 
shown not to be the case. In the summer of 2011 
serious debates took place in the Iranian media about 
Iran’s policy toward Syria; these were, however, quick-
ly quelled. On the international level Tehran sup-
ported the Annan Plan and later the efforts of Lakhdar 
Brahimi, parallel to this the Iranians attempted in 
unofficial talks to convince Assad to introduce sub-
stantial reforms. Yet in early 2012 Supreme Leader 
Khamenei not only demonstratively gave his backing 
to Bashar al-Assad; he also obligated the Lebanese 
Hezbollah to support the Syrian Baathists. This appar-
ently came in the wake of a failed attempted by Ira-
nian diplomats to initiate talks with parts of the 
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Having taken up such an 
uncompromising position, it now became difficult if 
not impossible for Iran to back down from this foreign 
policy line. The “axis of resistance” became a complete 
farce, however, after Hamas left it in mid-2012 and 
moved its headquarters from Damascus back to 
Qatar.122
In general Iranian foreign policy was very slow to 
react to the events in Syria. There are both ideological 
and strategic reasons for this: first of all the ideologi-
cal paradigm of the “axis of resistance” prevented any 
debate about the possible legitimacy of the Syrian 
rebels for this would have destroyed the pretence of 
the alliance against Israel enjoying popular support. 
It is a pretence that from mid-October 2012 onwards 
could in any case no longer be publically maintained 
in Iran,
 The visit of the Emir of Qatar to Gaza con-
stituted a further humiliation for Iran, for no other 
gesture would have illustrated so clearly that the 
Palestinian issue had once again become an Arab 
affair, and one with a Wahhabi flavour to boot. 
123
 
122  Erik Mohns and André Bank, “Syrian Revolt Fallout: 
End of the Resistance Axis?,” Middle East Policy, vol. 19, no. 3 
(Autumn 2012): 25–35 (31). 
 yet Supreme Leader Khamenei continues to 
adhere to it in his statements. Accordingly, official 
123  “Cluster Bombs Dropped on the People of Syria: How 
Will History Judge Our Silence?” (Persian), Baztab, October 15, 
2012. 
Iranian statements in October 2012 underlined the 
importance of the arsenal of rockets supplied by Teh-
ran to the Gaza Strip for Hamas’s fight against Israel. 
A further explanation for this stubborn determination 
to keep the axis alive is Iran’s close intelligence and 
military cooperation with Syria. The IRGC and intel-
ligence services have cooperated with Syria ever since 
they were founded and this relationship is vital for 
Iranian power projection in Lebanon. Finally, the Ira-
nians assume that the Assad regime, though weak-
ened, is not yet finished. The leadership in Tehran 
believes that the conflict will continue for a long time 
and eventually involve the whole region. This is why 
the most important declarations of support for the 
regime have come from the Iranian security appara-
tus, although the embarrassing hostage-taking of IRGC 
operatives by Syrian rebels in summer 2012124
There are no official declarations about how Iranian 
decision-makers imagine the post-Assad era, but two 
goals seem plausible: first, to prevent a major flaring 
up of Sunni-Shiite conflicts, which would ultimately 
affect every state in the region; and second, to enable 
Iran to maintain as large a presence as possible in the 
region. The Egyptian initiative in September 2012 to 
form a “Syrian Quartet”, consisting of Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, Turkey and Iran, was welcomed by Tehran for 
precisely this reason.
 made 
Tehran nervous. 
125
 
124  Thomas Shanker and Damien Cave, “Syrian Rebels Said 
to Be Holding Elite Fighters from Iran,” The New York Times, 
August 15, 2012. 
 Irrespective of whether this 
quartet actually comes into being – Saudi-Arabia can-
celled its attendance at a meeting at ministerial level 
at short notice –Tehran appears willing to participate 
in a transformation process in Syria. This change of 
position in the background is most probably moti-
vated by pragmatic interests – maslahat – but with the 
end of the “axis of resistance” a change of ideological 
paradigm is surely on the cards sooner or later. It thus 
looks as if Syria is where the strategic and ideological 
future of the Islamic Republic of Iran will be decided. 
125  “Egypt Hosts Summit of New Quartet on Syria, Hoping 
to Persuade Iran to Change Stance,” CBS News, September 11, 
2012. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
While the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran has an ideological foundation, its translation 
into practice is pragmatic. Political Islam plays only 
a minor role in relations with the international 
community, since the question of who is the true 
“commander of the faithful” in the Islamic world is 
of little importance for the rest of the world. Given 
Iran’s Persian-Shiite identity and Tehran’s failure so 
far to instrumentalise the region’s Shiites, it remains 
unlikely that the Iranian variant of an Islamic repub-
lic will become a role model for the Middle East. 
More problematic for the West is Iran’s espousal of 
a Third World ideology and the anti-Americanism in-
herent in this. The Third World ideology is a problem 
because it offers no set of instruments that would 
allow a conceptionally appropriate response to the 
challenges of the twentieth century. The intellectual 
models used to describe the relationship between the 
First and Third World from the 1950s to the 1970s 
have at the latest since the demise of the USSR and 
the globalisation of the 1990s lost their currency. As 
long as Iran continues to cling to the anti-imperialist 
clichés of the last century, it will inevitably mis-
understand and misinterpret Western intentions. The 
frustrations of European diplomats about the mutual 
lack of understanding during the nuclear negotiations 
testify eloquently to this. Iran’s isolation by large parts 
of the international community and the pressure of 
sanctions have made the “ersatz world public sphere” 
in the form of the non-aligned states ever more im-
portant for Iran, which ultimately declared this the 
“true world community”. Because of its geostrategic 
position Iran cannot go down the North Korean road 
of total isolation. In some form or other Iran will 
always be connected with its neighbouring regions. 
Yet the more isolated Iran is, the more unpredictable 
Iranian foreign policy will become. The risk of an 
escalation of the conflict between the West and Iran 
would then rise by several orders of magnitude. 
An unpredictable, destructive Iran is, however, just 
as inacceptable for the West as Iranian hegemony in 
the region. For Europe and the West, therefore, the 
main question that arises is what position Iran could 
take and what role it could play, bearing in mind con-
verging interests. The greatest of these are of course 
Iran’s role as a reliable energy supplier, as a transport 
hub between East and West and as a security partner 
in Afghanistan and elsewhere: in other words, in pre-
cisely those areas where Iran sees its economic future. 
A European vision might be of an Iran as a reliable 
supplier of energy and a security cooperation partner 
that maintains a certain strategic distance from 
Russia. 
Under the current circumstances economic and 
development cooperation are of course impossible; 
yet, ironically, it is the field of security where cooper-
ation has already become a reality. Important allies of 
the West such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Qatar and Oman 
have signed security agreements with both Iran and 
the United States (or other Western states) or with 
NATO. This may be regarded as confirmation that 
Iran’s neighbours are aware of the benefits of a cooper-
ative approach to regional security. Before formal co-
operation or official contact can take place, however, 
Iran needs to further tone down its anti-Americanism 
and speak directly to the United States. A willingness 
to do so is already discernible, but the only person 
who can bring about such a change of paradigm 
against internal resistance is Supreme Leader Khame-
nei himself. His ability to change course was already 
demonstrated when he and Rafsanjani launched the 
post-revolutionary phase in Iran following the death 
of Khomeini. 
The collapse of the “axis of resistance” – an ideo-
logical disaster from an Iranian point of view – will 
reinforce this process, albeit with the proviso that the 
West includes Tehran in a peaceful solution for Syria. 
The implication is that the involvement of Iran in the 
Syrian transformation process would also contain 
Iran’s interest in exerting influence in the region. The 
only role that Iran would be able to play in the Levant, 
would then be that of an indirect partner of the West, 
since both sides share the same fears about the activi-
ties of radical Sunni Islamist groups. 
The danger of a flaring up of religious conflicts is 
equally high for both the West and Iran; neither, how-
ever, possesses the capability beyond placatory decla-
rations to prevent this happening. Here the West 
needs to strengthen Egypt’s leadership role, since on 
account of its history and its important function as a 
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leading Arab power only Egypt would be in a position 
to counter the defamation of Arab Shiites by empha-
sising their Arab-Muslim identity. In the medium 
term that would also raise the status of Iraq as an 
Arab-Shiite country and thus restore the old balance 
between Iraq and Iran, only this time on the basis of 
identity. 
Given the dramatic regional developments Iran’s 
relationship with the West needs to be reconsidered 
by both sides. A prerequisite for this would be to 
expand contacts with the Iranian think tank scene, 
thus facilitating a more sophisticated exchange of 
views and minimising the risk of false signals and 
misunderstandings of the kind that have often oc-
curred in recent years through self-appointed inter-
mediaries and commentators. Of paramount impor-
tance are direct American-Iranian contacts. Currently 
the best contacts between Iran and a Western coun-
try are those with Germany, making Germany the 
obvious candidate for trans-Atlantic mediation. 
Even if there are grounds for optimism, one should 
not fall prey to any illusions: the future of Iran and 
the region does not depend solely on how bloody 
the transformation process in Syria is, but also on 
whether agreement can be reached on the nuclear 
issue. Right from the start this has been not just a 
question of realpolitik but an ideological bone of con-
tention, for the Iranians know full well that any 
solution will have to be reached with rather than 
against the United States. Either way Tehran will 
not come out of this ideologically unscathed. 
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